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This paper uses the BEEPS firm-level data to study the process of convergence of transition 
countries with developed market economies. The primary focus of the study is on competition 
and market structure, finance and the structure of lending to firms, and how firms respond to the 
economic environment by restructuring; we are able to do this because the BEEPS cover 
thousands of firms from virtually all transition countries over a long time period (1996-99 
through 2002-05), as well firms from developed market economies, thus providing a set of natural 
benchmarks. We find substantial evidence of convergence of transition countries with developed 
market economies in a number of dimensions.  The pattern of growth at the country, sectoral and 
firm level shows rapid growth of the new private sector and of the micro- and small-firm sectors, 
with the size distribution of firms moving towards the pattern observed in the BEEPS surveys of 
developed market economies. Our interpretation of the evidence on competition is that there is an 
initial move by firms into niches to exploit local market power, and later in transition entry and 
domestic competitive pressure increases. In finance, the increasing reliance on retained earnings 
in transition countries reflects a maturation of the sector as new firms come to rely less on 
informal and family sources of finance. The scale of restructuring and innovation activity is as 
high or higher in transition economies as in developed market economies.  Interestingly, we find 
evidence of an inverse-U shape pattern, with the peak of restructuring activity taking place in 
2002, the middle of the period analyzed.  Throughout, the regional patterns suggest greater 
convergence in the transition countries that joined the European Union in 2004 than in the other, 
lower-income transition economies. 
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I.  Introduction: motivation and analytical framework 
 
To use the terminology of classical growth theory, the period of socialism put the 
transition countries (TEs) off the path of “convergence” with, or “catching up” to, the 
mature or developed market economies (DMEs).  The simplest illustration of this is the 
dynamics of per capita output during the socialist period in two transition countries 
bordering Germany.  In 1938, Poland’s per capita GDP was considerably below that of 
Germany and hence well behind the “technological frontier”, whereas GDP per capita in 
Czechoslovakia was the same or higher that of Germany and hence close to the frontier.  
By the late 1980s, productivity and living standards in both countries were lagging far 
behind their Western neighbor.  It was the underperformance of the centrally planned 
economies, including a virtual stagnation in the 1980s, that motivated the dissatisfaction 
with central planning and market socialism and the move from plan to market in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The expectation was that that the return to the 
market would put these countries onto a growth path that would lead eventually to 
convergence with the mature market economies operating at the world technological 
frontier. 
 
This paper is about convergence of the transition countries with developed market 
economies. The term “convergence”, however, has several distinct meanings. The above 
example refers to convergence as bridging the gap in per capita output between the 
countries. Such catching-up at the aggregate level, however, may be decomposed into 
changes (or convergence) at lower levels: convergence in technology and productivity, 
convergence in economic structure, and convergence in institutions.  
 
Convergence in the broad sense is a concept from the macro growth literature. The 
neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) and its successors predicts, under certain 
assumptions and regardless of the initial income level, convergence of country’s per-
capita output to a steady state.  In these production function models, the technological 
level of the economy is captured by a multiplicative productivity or technology 
parameter, and the steady state income level is determined by the savings/investment rate   3
and this productivity parameter.  The earliest such models treated the technology 
parameter as exogenous and growing at a constant rate.  Later developments treated 
technology as endogenous, and distinguished between generation of technology by R&D 
activity – typical of advanced market economies operating at or near the world 
technological frontier – and aggregate improvements in technology-driven “catching-up”, 
whereby low productivity countries are able to grow quickly by adopting technologies 
that have already been developed.  It is the latter source of growth and convergence that 
underlay the early hopes and expectations that income levels in the formerly socialist 
economists would eventually converge to development market economy levels.  During 
period of central planning, the socialist economies were initially able to grow rapidly, but 
the inherent inefficiencies of central planning implied lags in innovation and diffusion of 
technology, and meant this catching-up had ceased by the 1980s, generating an 
“equilibrium technological gap” (Gomulka 1986). Abandoning central planning would 
enable adoption of improved technology and management practices and enable the 
resumption of catching-up.  This source of endogenous growth has a long intellectual 
prehistory: Veblen (1915) and Gerschenkron (1952, 1962) proposed and analyzed the 
“advantages of backwardness” in the process of European industrialization and growth. 
 
A second macro-level of convergence and source of growth for the transition economies 
is in terms of endowments and the structure of economic activity.  At the start of the 
transition, the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia looked very different from 
the market economies at similar levels of income: large but low productivity industrial 
sectors, small agricultural sectors that would be more typical of richer, industrialized 
countries, and small services sectors.  The modeling framework here is that pioneered by 
Kuznets (1955, 1965) and Chenery et al. (1968, 1975): as market economies industrialize, 
their structure changes in various ways.  In particular, as economies develop, the share of 
agriculture in GDP and employment falls and the shares of manufacturing and services 
increase.  The sources of these changes in the size of sectors have been modeled by 
Rowthorne and Ramaswamy (1997) amongst others as driven by (exogenous) differences 
in productivity growth across sectors.  Convergence by the former socialist economies in 
this context would generate growth by reallocating factors away from the excessively-  4
large industrial sector and into the market services that the central planners had repressed 
(Döhrn and Heilemann 1996; Raiser, Schaffer and Schuchhardt 2004).  
 
Underlying both these sorts of productivity-driven convergence in transition economies is 
productivity growth and reallocation at the firm level.  Inefficient state-owned industrial 
firms were expected to downsize; new private firms would spring up, filling market 
niches that were neglected by the central planners; firms would adopt proven Western 
technology, production methods, and product standards; both new private firms and 
privatized state-owned firms would see efficiency improvements driven by the incentives 
brought by private ownership. 
 
The example of ownership structure as a source of productivity growth and convergence 
makes clear that the technology parameter incorporates much more than “technology” 
narrowly defined.  Lucas (1988), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and others pointed to 
the importance of human capital accumulation for growth, and implicitly at the 
importance of institutions that generate human capital such as the education sector.  More 
recently, research in conditional convergence has explicitly examined the role of 
institutions in determining both the level of productivity of an economy and the rate at 
which it endogenously generates growth, e.g., property rights and legal protection, the 
institutions of capitalism brought by European settlers to colonies in the 17
th-19
th 
centuries (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001), international trade and globalization, 
regulation and competition, and others; see Acemoglu (2007) for a very recent and 
comprehensive survey.  Broadly speaking, the consensus view in literature is that of 
North (1990) and others that institutions matter hugely for economic growth and 
productivity, and debates today focus on which institutions matter and how, e.g., Rodrik 
(2006) argues against the “one-size-fits-all” view, suggesting instead that there are roles 
for policies, institutions and state interventions that are appropriate specifically for 
developing countries that are converging.  China is the most-often cited example of a 
rapidly growing country that has adopted some of the institutions of developed capitalism 
(e.g., competitive markets, free entry) but not others (e.g., a legalistic approach to the 
protection of property rights).  The convergence debate here is in effect returning to its   5
roots, since both Veblen and Gerschenkron paid close attention to the special institutional 
characteristics, and especially the role of the state, in the catching up by Germany and 
other European countries in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries. 
 
It is this “institutional catching-up” that is at the heart of the view that the transition 
countries can both grow rapidly and converge in various dimensions towards the 
developed market economies.  When countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
started their transition process, they lacked well-functioning markets of all sorts – product 
markets, factor markets, financial markets – while their institutions, inherited from the 
era of central planning, were very different from the range of those observed in either 
mature or middle income market economies.  This “institutional gap” and the need for 
institutional reforms was recognized at the very start of transition (see, e.g., Fischer and 
Gelb 1991).  Convergence of the transition countries in terms of institutions should 
therefore be accompanied by growth in productivity and living standards. More nuanced 
versions of this argument point to the importance of history and the strength of the 
institutional inheritance from the pre-socialist period (sometimes called or even proxied 
by “the distance to Brussels”; see Fidrmuc 2003), and to the role of prospective or actual 
EU membership in generating institutional change: transition countries with experience 
of developed capitalism in living memory and members of the EU (e.g., the Baltics) are 
expected to converge more rapidly than countries with neither (e.g., the Central Asian 
states). 
 
The same intellectual framework motivated the research and policy agendas of the World 
Bank and EBRD looking at the “business environment” and “investment climate” (see, 
e.g., World Bank 2004, EBRD 2005).  Over a period of years, both institutions have 
engaged in large-scale research efforts, looking at the quality of the business environment 
in transition, developing and developed market economies.  The policy perspective 
behind these efforts is straightforward: promotion of policies and institutions that create 
sustainable growth.  For the most part, these recommend policies and institutions that are 
in place in many developed market economies, and hence the implication is that   6
convergence in policies and institutions will generate catch-up growth and thus 
convergence in productivity and living standards. 
 
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) implemented 
in the transition economies by EBRD and the World Bank are part of this research effort.  
The BEEPS surveys, and the similarly-motivated Investment Climate Surveys (ICS), are 
large-scale surveys of firms that have been implemented in many countries since the late 
1990s.  In addition to standard questions about the characteristics and performance of the 
firms, the surveys have a strong focus on the economic and business environment in 
which managers have to operate.  There have been many studies to date using the BEEPS 
and ICS data.  Some of these studies have focused on direct measurement and 
characterization of various aspects of the business environment (e.g., the effectiveness 
government, corruption, the legal system, business infrastructure); Kaufman, Hellman, 
Jones and Schankerman (2000) and World Bank (2006) are examples.  Others have tried 
to estimate econometrically the relationship between aspects of the business environment 
and productivity at the firm level (e.g., Dollar, Hallward-Dreimeier and Mengistae 2005, 
Svejnar and Commander 2007, Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright 2006). 
 
Our paper is a contribution to this literature: we use the waves of BEEPS data to analyze 
the convergence process in the transition economies.  The BEEPS consist of a series of 3 
snapshots of virtually all transition economies in 1999, 2002 and 2005, plus, crucially, 
selected developed market economies in 2004-05.  The BEEPS has a number of useful 
features for our analysis: 
 
  The surveys are random and representative samples that cover all TEs, allowing 
ready identification of broad patterns. 
  The first year of the BEEPS surveys is 1999, and it happens also to be the first 
post-financial crisis year, when the transformational recession is more or less 
over, and growth starts across the region.  We are able to analyze 6 years of 
change, convergence and growth.   7
  We are able to benchmark the TEs against other, mostly non-transition countries 
in 2004-05.  In particular, we have BEEPS data from developed and cohesion 
Europe (Germany, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal), developed Asia (South 




The benchmarking BEEPS surveys have not been used much by researchers to date, but 
play a central role in our analysis, because together with the time series dimension of the 
BEEPS data, they enable us to analyze the convergence process.  Where our approach 
differs from most previous studies using the BEEPS data is that our focus is not on direct 
measurement of institutions, something which is notoriously difficult in the best of 
circumstances.
2  Rather, we look primarily at the function of, and convergence in, 
markets and firm behavior that are shaped by particular institutions.  We focus in 
particular on competition and market structure, finance and the structure of lending to 
firms, and how firms respond to the economic environment by restructuring.  Analyzing 
restructuring activity through the convergence prism is particularly interesting in the 
transition context, since it provides an example where we expect successful convergence 
to be associated with a high initial level of restructuring – possibly appearing after an 
initial low level of restructuring and then “take-off” early in the transition period – as 
firms make major investments to adjust to the new market economy environment, 
followed by a decline over time.  Our analysis is thus closest in spirit to the “structural 
convergence” literature pioneered by Kuznets and Chenery.  Unlike this literature, 
however, which operates at the sectoral level, and the growth and convergence literature, 
which operates at the macro level, we are drilling down to the level of firms. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the BEEPS surveys and samples 
and introduces the country classification we use.  Section III sets the scene by presenting 
the stylized facts of growth and convergence as they have been analyzed in the literature 
                                                 
1 The “Cohesion” group includes Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the countries which in the late 1990s 
were recipients of the EU cohesion funds.  
2 Thus Blanchard (2007) makes this point for an application that is relatively straightforward compared to 
ours: measurement of labor market institutions in the OECD countries.   8
and as they manifest themselves in the BEEPS surveys.  In Sections IV and V, we 
analyze the evidence on convergence in two dimensions of the business environment: 
competition and financing.  Section VI looks at how firms have responded in terms of 
restructuring.  Section VII concludes. 
 
 
II.  Sample description, country classification and benchmarking 
 
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) have been 
conducted by the World Bank and EBRD since 1999.  As the name suggests, the focus of 
the interviews with firm managers is the business environment in which firms are 
operating, but the data collected also include key figures about the firm, including sales, 
inputs, and growth.  Most of the data gathered have come from three waves of surveys – 
1999, 2002 and 2005 – implemented in nearly all the transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The BEEPS were extended in 2004 and 
2005 to include a range of comparator countries from Western Europe and East Asia.  
 
Survey samples were constructed by random sampling from a national registry of firms 
or equivalent, with oversampling of some additional categories of firms to ensure 
reasonable subsample sizes.  The firms covered are drawn from industry and services,
3 
and, like the population of firms in countries around the world, are mostly SMEs (see 
Table II.1).  A majority of the firms surveyed in the transition countries (60% in 1999, 
rising to 75% in 2005) are new private sector firms, i.e., they were private from the point 
of startup.  Privatized firms make up about 15-25% of the sample, and the remaining 10-
15% were state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  The shares of both privatized and SOEs in 
the BEEPS transition samples have been falling over time.  The samples from the non-
transition market economy comparator countries include very few SOEs and privatized 
firms, which means that our benchmark is the market economy private sector. 
 
                                                 
3 A small number of firms in agriculture, fishery, forestry as well as in power generation in the 1999 
BEEPS survey are classified in this paper as manufacturing.    9
The strengths of the survey, from the point of view of this paper, are the use of a 
consistent survey instrument across virtually all transition countries and range of market 
economy comparators, and, for the transition countries, over a substantial period of time.
4  
The 1999 and subsequent BEEPS surveys included 3-year retrospective questions, and 
we are therefore able to track developments in transition over a period of 6 to 9 years.  
These two strengths allow us to benchmark the transition countries against developed 
market economies, and to track their progress in transition.  The main weakness of the 
BEEPS is the consequence of the wide coverage and finite budgets: the sample sizes for 
individual countries are relatively small.  Even in the biggest BEEPS round in 2005, most 
country samples have fewer than 400 firms.  In the first BEEPS surveys in 1999, a typical 
country sample had about 150 firms.  See Table II.2 for the composition of BEEPS 
surveys by country and year of implementation.  The implication of this is that too great a 
degree of disaggregation in the analysis would results in systematic differences across 
countries and over time being swamped by noise in the data.  We therefore aggregate 
across countries in much of our analysis. 
 
Our aggregation scheme separates countries according to position in Europe at the time 
of the most recent BEEPS surveys in 2005, and according to income as of 1999:  
 
Aggregation scheme: by income and position in Europe 
 
I.  West Germany 
II.  Cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) 
III.  EU8 (new members as of May 2004) (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia) 
IV.  Lower middle income transition countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro / Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine) 
                                                 
4 Although the BEEPS survey instrument has been modified each time it was implemented, the range of 
questions that remained consistent across surveys is substantial.   10
a.  SEE (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, 
Serbia and Montenegro) 
b.  Middle income CIS (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine) 
V.  Low income CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) 
 
We will sometimes refer to Groups I and II as the “pre-2001 EU” or “developed market 
economies” (DMEs), and groups III-V as “transition economies” (TEs).  
 
The income classification uses the standard World Bank scheme based on GNI per capita 
in 1999 (see Table II.4).  The division between I, II, III and IV is based on EU status as of 
2005, but also matches GNI per capita in 1999 almost exactly.  The division between IV 
and V is from the WB income classification.  Croatia is an outlier – located in South-
Eastern Europe, this country has GNI per capita that is substantially higher than that of 
the other countries of the region – and is therefore omitted from the analysis.  East 
Germany as well as Turkey, Korea and Vietnam were also included in the BEEPS 2004-
05 surveys, but these countries are too heterogeneous for aggregation; we omit them from 
the aggregation scheme and most of the analysis, but occasionally make use of them.  
 
III.  Growth and convergence 
 
As mentioned in the introductory section, this paper looks at the function of, and 
convergence in, markets and firm behavior of the transition countries with those in the 
developed market economies. Our focus is on competition and market structure, finance 
and the structure of lending to firms, and how firms respond to the economic 
environment by restructuring. We begin, however, by briefly reviewing the existing 
literature on growth and convergence in the transition countries at the micro level, 
assembling basic stylized facts and comparing them to the evidence from the BEEPS 
data. The purpose of this is two-fold: first, to set the scene for subsequent discussion, and 
second, to show important similarities between the previous findings in the literature and 
the BEEPS data. The latter will reinforce the evidence from the studies conducted in   11
various regions and various points of time, often using very different methodologies. It 
will also show that the BEEPS dataset, with its cross-sectional and time-series dimension, 
is particularly appropriate for studying the issues of convergence at the micro-level across 
the transition countries and over time.  
 
The process of economic transition has long been thought as consisting of two key 
elements, reallocation and restructuring (Blanchard 1997). The former involves 
intersector adjustments of production, from low value added sectors to those generating 
high value added. The term “intersector adjustment” is used here in a broad sense 
meaning reallocation from the state sector to the private sector as well as by branches of 
economic activity. “Restructuring” refers to the behavior of surviving firms: in particular, 
changes in the level and technical composition of labor and capital, in search of 
efficiency improvements. 
 
The economics literature on the transition process can be characterized by two broad 
views which differ by the relative importance attached to these two processes. One view 
emphasizes the inability of the old sector to quickly adapt to the new market environment 
and suggested that productivity improvements are mainly attained via the development of 
a new private sector. Thus, reallocation from the old sector to the new one is a focal point 
of the transition process according to this perspective. According to the other view, the 
restructuring of the existing firms, implying a collection of measures undertaken by these 
firms in order to survive and succeed in the market conditions, is an important 
contribution to improved productivity and economic growth. The second view thus 
emphasizes a particular aspect of convergence, namely convergence of the old firms with 
the new private businesses in terms of behavior and productivity. This is, however, a 
difference of emphasis; there is a broad consensus that both sources of productivity 
growth are important.  
 
A voluminous literature has studied reallocation, growth and productivity at the firm 
level in the transition countries. While a thorough review of these studies is outside the 
scope of this paper and can be found elsewhere (see, e.g., Djankov and Murrel 2002;   12
Haltiwanger, Lehmann and Terrell 2003; Iwasaki 2007), we briefly summarize here the 
main findings in this field.  
 
We begin with a caveat, namely that scholars in the field have faced considerable 
difficulties in measuring firm performance in the transition environment. For example, as 
pointed out in Bevan, Estrin and Schaffer (1999) and also acknowledged in Djankov and 
Murrel (2002), indicators that are based on capital stock, assets, or equity may be very 
noisy and uninformative of the actual performance of firms because of the high inflation 
rates, deficiencies in the accounting standards or underdevelopment of stock markets in 
the transition economies. Therefore, the bulk of studies in the field rely on the measures 
of performance that are based on employment and sales (e.g., growth of sales, 
employment labor productivity), as the least noisy indicators, particularly employment. 
Another related problem is that some indicators may be suitable for the analysis of the 
traditional firms, but fail to provide a meaningful comparison between them and the 
newly established businesses. The latter may expand labor rapidly but sometimes have, or 
appear to have, falling labor productivity because they are expanding employment faster 
than sales.  The appearance rather than the reality may be driven by reporting biases: 
greater reluctance to share information about growing sales than growing employment.  
Labor shedding, on the other hand, is a characteristic of SOEs and privatized firms in 
early and middle transition. 
 
Haltiwanger et al. (2003) provide a thorough survey of studies analyzing employment 
growth, job creation and destruction in the transition economies. Based on the evidence 
from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Bilsen and Konings 1998), the Czech Republic 
(Jurajda and Terrell 2002), Estonia (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec 2002), and Poland 
(Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer 1996) they conclude that small and new private firms 
contribute disproportionately to job creation while state-owned firms are responsible for 
most of the job destruction. Another important conclusion from the literature is that the 
patterns of employment growth, job creation and job destruction vary over the transition 
period: job destruction dominates job creation in the early transition period, but the 
magnitude of the two processes converges at the later stages. In particular, already by   13
1995 the job reallocation rates in the CEE countries are similar to those in mature 
capitalist economies (about 20 percent) with roughly equal job creation and destruction 
rates (Davis and Haltiwanger 1999).  
 
The general patterns evident in the BEEPS data are broadly in accord with these earlier 
findings of firm growth. Table III.1 shows the balance between growing and shrinking 
firms, i.e., the proportion of the sample of firms that is growing less the proportion that is 
shrinking (no growth firms are ignored).  Here and below, growth is in real terms and 
covers the 3 years preceding the survey.  Germany was in a period of macroeconomic 
stagnation during the period 2001-04, and this is apparent in the table, with the share of 
firms with growing sales exceeding the share of shrinking firms by only 5 percentage 
points.  The cohesion countries, by contrast, were growing rapidly, with the number of 
firms with growing sales exceeding the shrinking share by 30 percentage points.  The 
EU8 look very similar, and also show a moderate slowdown over the full period covered 
by the BEEPS surveys.  An acceleration in growth is very apparent in the poorest 
countries/slowest reformers (middle income and low income CIS), going from near 
stagnation in 1996-99 to rapid expansion in 2002-05. 
 
The picture in terms of employment is more muted.  The number of firms with expanding 
employment in the EU8 has barely exceeded the number of downsizing firms from the 
very start of the BEEPS surveys.  This share is, moreover, low compared to that in the 
cohesion countries.  Here we see the first evidence of a possible failure of convergence: 
evidence of possible stagnating job growth in the new EU members.  We will return to 
this point below.  The pattern in the other regions is quite different: in SEE, firms 
expanding employment have markedly outnumbered firms shedding labor since 1996-99; 
and in the middle income CIS and low income countries, stagnation in 1996-99 is 
replaced by large-scale expansion in more recent years. 
 
Part of the explanation can be attributed to continued downsizing of employment and 
restructuring of state-owned and privatized firms.  By 2005, these firms are sharing in the 
output expansion in TEs with new private firms, but are still shedding labor.  Privatized   14
and state-owned firms, especially SMEs, are rare in the cohesion countries and are almost 
absent from the cohesion country samples.  Table III.2 shows that in terms of sales, state-
owned and privatized firms in TEs went from being relatively stagnant in 1996-99 to 
predominantly expanding 2002-05, and indeed the share of firms with expanding sales in 
the latter period was very similar for state-owned, privatized and new private firms.  In 
terms of employment, however, state-owned and privatized firms had large shares of 
downsizing firms during the period spanned by the BEEPS, though declining over time. 
This is in contrast to the new private firm sector, which was expanding employment. 
These patterns of employment growth have been previously found in earlier studies based 
on smaller samples covering one or few transition countries, such as Richter and Schaffer 
(1996), Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko (1996) and Bilsen and Konings (1998), among 
others.  What is interesting and new in the BEEPS data is that the downsizing of the 
traditional firms, according to the BEEPS data, continues in all the regions even a decade 
after the start of transition. 
 
Table III.3 looks at job growth in the more concrete terms of job creation (JC), job 
destruction (JD), net job growth (JG) and job reallocation (JR) rates, thus focusing on 
aggregate employment growth.  The picture is rather different from what one finds in the 
balance table Table III.1, because that table simply count firms, and the smaller firms are 
more likely to be expanding but contribute less to the aggregate growth.  The table shows 
that job growth (defined as JCR-JDR) is higher in the richer TEs in the 1996-99 period, 
but this reverses by 2002-05, when the poorer TEs have faster employment growth.  The 
reversal is driven by both job creation and job destruction.  Job creation rates in the EU8 
are lower than those in the cohesion countries, and the acceleration in JC takes the poorer 
TEs ahead of the EU8 by 2002-05.  Job destruction rates are persistently higher in the 
EU8 than in the cohesion countries, and fall markedly in the poorer TEs so that by 2002-
05, job destruction is less common than in the EU8.  Job reallocation (defined as JC+JD) 
is, however, fairly constant across time and across groups of TEs.  Again, these patterns 
are broadly consistent with previous literature suggesting that high rates of job 
destruction are typical of the earlier stage of the transition process and level off over time 
while job creation rates increase (Haltiwanger et al. 2003).   15
 
How do job creation, destruction and reallocation compare in transition and developed 
market economies?  Previous such comparisons have been made by Konings et al. 
(1996), Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002), and the 
papers in the symposium edited by Haltiwanger et al. (2003).  These studies typically 
show that during the socialist period and in the early years of transition, gross job 
creation rates in state-owned manufacturing did not change hugely and were similar to 
those in the OECD, while job destruction rates in the state-owned sector following the 
start of transition increased dramatically and then decline.  New private sector firms, by 
contrast, show high rates of job creation, job destruction, with the former predominant 
especially in the early phase of transition.  It should be noted that such comparisons need 
to be interpreted with caution as they were hampered by lack of full compatibility of 
samples; in particular, studies for TEs have typically used firm-level data, whereas 
studies of JC/JD in Western economies have used establishment-level data.  In this 
respect, the BEEPS data offer a better opportunity for such comparison.  The data 
presented in Table III.3 show that for the later transition period, the job reallocation rate 
is actually no higher in the TEs than in the cohesion countries – about 20% – and has 
been very steady in the TEs. 
 
A more detailed picture of regional patterns and convergence in firm growth can be 
obtained from a decomposition analysis of employment growth.
5  This can help 
answering such questions as to what extent the differences in the employment growth 
rates observed across regions are due to the differences in the endowments of the 
respective economies –specifically, ownership, sectoral distribution, and size of firms – 
or stem from different relationships between these characteristics and firm growth across 
the regions.  For example, we expect that “traditional” (state-owned and privatized) firms 
will contribute less to employment growth than the new private sector.  The sectoral 
distribution of employment across traditional and new private firms is different in the 
EU8 countries and in the CIS countries.  How much of the difference in the employment 
growth rates between the two groups of economies should we attribute to having different 
                                                 
5 We used Ben Jann’s (2005) “decompose” addin for Stata for the decompositions in this section.   16
employment shares of traditional firms?  And how much should we attribute to the fact 
that the employment growth rates of traditional firms are different in these two groups of 
economies, reflecting different progress in enterprise restructuring?  
 
We consider 3 sources of differences in employment growth: ownership, sectors, and 
size.  The decompositions are performed for the following groups of countries:  
  Cohesion group versus the EU8 groups 
  EU8 group versus SEE group 
  EU8 group versus CIS group 
  SEE group versus CIS group  
 
In these comparisons, the first group plays the role of a benchmark (leaders) while the 
second group embraces the countries that, according to the transition literature, can be 
regarded as convergers or followers. 
 
The decompositions separate the contributions to growth into the following categories of 
effects: 
  Sectoral effects. 
  Size effects, new private sector. 
  State ownership effects. 
  State ownership size effects. 
  Privatized effects. 
  Privatized size effects. 
It is important to control for and quantify size effects because of the size differences 
between the different ownership categories of firms – new private firms are smaller than 
state-owned firms – and we need to distinguish between the effects of ownership and the 
dynamics of size.  We allow for size effects that can vary across ownership categories. 
 
The decomposition method is standard and is discussed in detail in the Appendix.  In 
brief, we estimate regressions separately for each group of countries in which the 
dependent variable is the growth rate of employment, and the regressors are a set of   17
sector dummy variables, a size variable (log employment), dummy variables for state and 
privatized firms, and the interaction of the state and privatized dummies with the size 
variable.  The means of these variables are the “endowments”, and the coefficients are the 
per-unit contributions of these different country characteristics.  Thus, for example, the 
contribution of the sectoral distribution of firms can be decomposed into differences 
between country groups in how many firms are in each sector (“endowments”) and 
differences between country groups in how fast each sector is growing (“coefficients”).  
As is standard in this literature, there is also an interaction effect between endowments 
and coefficients.  We summarize below the results of the employment growth 
decomposition analysis in Figures III.1-III.8.  A more detailed discussion of the 
decomposition framework, the regression results and detailed decomposition tables is 
presented in the Appendix. 
 
The decompositions come in two forms: (a) decomposition of aggregate or total 
employment growth, which is obtained by using regressions weighted by average 
employment; (b) decomposition of average or firm employment growth, which is 
obtained by using unweighted regressions. The former shows aggregate employment 
effects and is comparable to the analysis of job creation and destruction presented above 
(Table III.3). The latter is comparable to much of literature on the growth of firms, and to 
our analysis above (Tables III.1 and III.2).  The definitions of growth are the same as 
those used for the job creation/job destruction growth rate definitions.  
 
The main results of the comparison of the Cohesion and the EU8 countries are shown in 
Figure III.1.  These results refer to aggregate employment growth.  The first two bars in 
the figure show the net growth rates in the two groups of countries and their contributing 
factors.  In particular, for aggregate employment the net growth rate in the Cohesion 
group is equal to 6.40% and is largely determined by sectoral differences in growth rates 
and employment (which cumulatively amount to a growth rate of 6.69%) with only a   18
small negative contribution of size effects (-0.30%).
6  Similarly, the net growth rate in the 
EU8 is equal to -1.64% and is composed of a large cumulative sectoral effect (10.48%), a 
large negative contribution of state ownership (-7.43%), a somewhat smaller negative 
effects of the privatized sector (-2.64%) and the size impact of privatized firms 
(-2.16%).
7  The size of firms in the private sector and in the state sector contribute little 
to the aggregate employment growth. Overall, the high contribution of growth among the 
private firms in the EU8 (which is considerably faster than in the Cohesion group) is 
completely wiped out by the negative ownership and ownership-size effects of the state 
and privatized sectors of -11.85%.   
 
Bar 3 of Figure III.1 shows contributions of these factors to the differences in the 
employment growth rates across the two groups of countries.  Because sectoral growth 
among private firms is faster in the EU8 group (followers/convergers, poorer group) than 
in the Cohesion group (leader, benchmark group), the corresponding difference appears 
as negative number in bar 3 of the figure (6.69%-10.48% = -3.79%). Conversely, state 
and privatized ownership effects appear as large negative numbers in bar 2, being drags 
on growth in followers, and thus as positive numbers in bar 3 (slowing down the catch-up 
process).     
 
Finally, bar 4 of Figure III.1 shows the decomposition results, which further disaggregate 
the effects of ownership, sector and size into endowment and coefficient effects, as 
discussed in the decomposition framework.  It appears that the presence of state and 
privatized firms in the EU8 (endowment of these countries with such enterprises) slows 
down the employment growth rate and, consequently, the catch-up process in these 
economies (the contribution of these endowment effects to the difference in the observed 
employment growth rates is 7.04% and 4.8% respectively).  In contrast, the differences in 
                                                 
6 These numbers are the predicted values from the regression of employment growth in the Cohesion 
countries on sectoral dummies and firm size variable (the ownership variables are missing because the 
Cohesion sub-sample only includes new private firms). 
7 These numbers are the predicted values from the regression of employment growth in the new UE 
members on sectoral and ownership dummies, firm size variable, and its interaction with ownership 
variables.   19
the sector/size distribution of firms (endowment effect) as well as in the sector/size 
growth rates (coefficient effects) contribute to higher growth in the EU8 countries. 
 
Figure III.2 shows the decomposition results for average employment growth for the 
same groups of countries. The main difference from the aggregate employment results 
presented in Figure III.1 is that the difference in the private sector growth rates is 
essentially nil. The reason is that the EU8 new private firms, which are growing rapidly, 
are small compared to the Cohesion new private firms, and therefore do not generate as 
much growth in aggregate.  The general pattern is the same, however: the growth gap 
between the Cohesion and the New EU countries is more than fully explained by slow 
growth of privatized and state firms in the latter group of countries. 
 
Decomposition analysis for the EU8 group and SEE countries is shown in Figures III.3-
III.4. Similarly to what we have observed in the comparison of the Cohesion countries 
with EU8 countries, the private sector growth rate (sectoral/size effects) is higher in the 
follower group (SEE), regardless of whether one looks at the aggregate (16.53% versus 
10.20%) or average (15.29% versus 7.74%) employment growth. The detailed 
decomposition results presented in the Appendix show that the growth differential 
between the new private sectors in the two groups of countries is not a size effect, but 
instead is driven mostly by the contribution of manufacturing employment growth in the 
SEE group. However, faster growth of private firms in these countries is completely 
offset (in the case of aggregate employment growth) or substantially mitigated (in the 
case of average growth) by downsizing of state-owned and privatized firms: the 
contribution of this sector, including size effects, is -11.84% in the EU8 and -24.06% in 
SEE (see, bar 2 of Figure III.3 and bar 2 of Figure III.4).
8  
                                                 
8 What is driving the smaller negative contributions of the state and privatized sectors in the decomposition 
of average as opposed to aggregate growth is that these sectors consist of firms which are relatively large 
and make a bigger negative contribution to aggregates than to means. We can see this by comparing the 
values for “State” and “Privatized” in the “Mean” columns in the weighted and unweighted results in the 
Appendix. In the weighted results, these are the values of aggregate employment in the sample, i.e., in the 
New EU sample, SOE+Privatized = 0.360+0.255=61.5% of employment; in the SEE/CIS sample, 
SOE+Privatized = 0.318+0.366=68.4% of employment.  In the unweighted results, SOE+Privatized = 
0.078+0.092=17.0% of firms in the New EU sample, and = 0.086+0.129=21.5% of firms in the SEE/CIS 
sample.   20
 
The last bar of Figure III.3 shows large coefficient effects of ownership, suggesting an 
important contribution of faster growth (or slower decline) of state-owned and privatized 
firms in the EU8 compared to the SEE group.  This can be interpreted as more advanced 
adaptation/restructuring of these enterprises in the former group of countries, the leaders 
in economic transition.  Also interesting is the effect of the difference in endowments in 
privatized firms, which also contributes to faster employment growth in the EU8.  The 
major negative contribution to faster growth in that region is the coefficient effect of firm 
size in the private sector, which may indicate maturation of new private firms or the 
exhaustion of growth opportunities due to increased competition (see also the discussion 
in the next section below on competition). Overall, we observe a kind of catching-up 
story: the new private sector boom is further advanced and slowing down in the EU8 
countries, but the downsizing of the state sector is also further advanced and slowing 
down.  The results for average employment growth (see Figure III.4) are similar, except 
for much less pronounced ownership effects.  
 
A comparison of the EU8 and CIS countries is shown in Figures III.5-III.6. Qualitatively, 
the results are remarkably similar to what we have found in the comparison of the EU8 
versus SEE countries.  In particular, the private sector is growing faster in the CIS than in 
the EU8 group, which is to a large extent a consequence of a much faster sectoral growth 
(in particular, in manufacturing) rather than a size effect.  
 
Given the remarkable similarities in the last two comparisons, it is of interest to 
benchmark the SEE group with the CIS countries. The results of this decomposition are 
shown in Figures III.7-III.8. The weighted/aggregate employment story is that the SEE 
and CIS new private sectors are almost identical; the big difference is the much bigger 
downsizing of the SOE and privatized sectors in SEE.  The unweighted/average firm 
story is that SEE and CIS look similar across all sectors.  The observed difference 
between the weighted and unweighted stories implies that the SOE/privatized downsizing 
in SEE is more concentrated in the larger firms.  The catching up story evidently does not 
hold in the CIS, since inasmuch as it is less advanced in the transition compared to the   21
SEE group, the downsizing of the state sector would have been expected to have been 
stronger. 
 
The notable differences between aggregate employment growth and mean firm 
employment growth that we have observed in the above analysis suggest a closer look at 
the size distribution of firms is warranted. An indication of convergence in this exercise 
would be an increase in employment in small firms relative to employment in large firms 
in the transition economies.  Indeed, planned economies had very few small firms, and 
the small firm sector would be expected to growth rapidly during the transition period to 
fill this gap (see, e.g., World Bank 2005 for detailed discussion of the Russian case).  We 
would therefore expect to find that the size distribution is evolving towards the pattern of 
the developed market economies, and that the new EU members have caught up more 
than the poorer TEs. 
 
This is indeed what we see in the BEEPS data.  Figure III.9 shows the distribution of firm 
size in West Germany and the cohesion countries, the EU8 countries and the other TEs, 
by four broad size categories: micro (1-9 employees), small (10-49), medium (50-199) 
and large (200+ employees).  Small and micro firms are most prevalent in the developed 
market economies of the EU, least common in the non-EU TEs, and the EU8 members 
occupy an intermediate position.  Figure III.10 shows the size distribution of firms in the 
new EU8 moving steadily towards the developed market economy pattern of large 
numbers of micro and small firms, and by 2005 the distribution is close to that observed 
in West Germany and the cohesion group.  Figure III.11 shows the same pattern in the 
poorer TEs, but these countries start in 1999 from a position of even fewer small firms, 
and although the small firm sector grows between 1999 and 2005, in 2005 it is still some 
distance from the market economy benchmark. 
 
As noted already, another test of the convergence hypothesis is to use data on reallocation 
across industrial sectors in the course of transition, where we would expect to see a 
Kuznets-Chenery-type pattern.  Raiser et al. (2004), in a study of 20-odd transition 
countries, divide total employment in to broad sectors (agriculture, industry, markets   22
services and nonmarket services), and show that employment shares during the transition 
have generally moved towards benchmarks calculated from a sample of market economy 
comparators: in particular, the share of industry has fallen and the share of market 
services has risen in all TEs.  These patterns are also evidenced in the relative growth 
rates of firm employment and jobs in the BEEPS surveys, but with a twist.  The 
employment growth regressions for 1999, 2002 and 2005 show that employment in trade 
and services firms has grown consistently faster than in manufacturing firms in the EU8 
countries.
9  The twist is that, for the lower-income TE country groups (SEE and CIS), the 
differential switches size and manufacturing firms grow as fast as services firms in 1996-
99 and then faster than services firms in 1999-02 and 2002-05.  When we look at 
aggregate employment growth (i.e., job growth), however, the pattern is different for TEs 
as a whole – net job growth is slower in manufacturing throughout the period – which is 
consistent with the findings by Raiser at al. (2004).
10 In short, we have evidence at the 
firm level of two different Kuznets-Chenery-type patterns.  In the higher-income TEs, the 
lower rate of employment growth in manufacturing relative to services reflects primarily 
a convergence to market economy benchmarks driven by industrial sectors  that were 
“too large” at the start of transition, and market services sectors that were “too small”.  In 
the lower-income TEs, the observed pattern of relatively higher rates of employment 
growth in manufacturing relative to services is consistent with a bigger impact of the 
standard Kuznets-Chenery-type pattern in which, as a country develops and productivity 
growth, employment in manufacturing first increases and then decreases. 
 
In sum, the picture painted by the BEEPS data is broadly consistent with both the basic 
macroeconomic trends in the region, and with previous sectoral and firm-level studies: 
following the “transformational recession” (Kornai 1994) of the mid-1990s, TEs have 
been growing, and at a faster rate than that observed in the developed market economies 
– convergence is under way.  The pattern of growth at the country, sectoral and firm level 
                                                 
9 These and other results discussed in this paragraph are not shown in the paper, but are available on 
request from the authors. 
10 The explanation for this contrast is as follows: Raiser et al. (2004) and other studies that have looked at 
structural change in this framework use shares of total employment, whereas the faster growth of 
manufacturing firms relative to services firms in the lower-income TEs that we report is based on firm level   23
show more rapid growth in the private and especially new private sectors, movement in 
the size distribution of firms towards the pattern of large numbers of small firms as seen 
in developed market economies, more evidence of convergence in the new EU members 
than in the poorer TEs, and evidence as well of Kuznet-Chenery type structural change 
across sectors. 
 
We now turn to the evidence on convergence in two key dimensions of the business 
environment, competition and finance, and how firms have responded to changes in terms 
of restructuring activity. 
 
IV.  Competitive environment 
 
Our motivation for this section is two-fold: the recognition, now widely shared, that 
competition is a key determinant of firm performance and the fact that competition and 
market structure remain among the least explored aspects of business environment in the 
transition economies.  We ask the following questions: how has the competition in TEs 
changed over time?  Does competition as perceived by firms now look comparable to 
developed market economies? 
 
To start with, under the central planning, competition, whether domestic or foreign, did 
not exist or was at best substituted with bureaucratic pressure, according to Djankov and 
Murrell (2002). The market structure was highly distorted, relative to the developed 
economies, with considerably fewer small and medium-sized firms (Roland 2000). Many 
state-owned enterprises, according to Newbery and Kattuman (1992), were effectively 
monopolists and there were concerns that privatization alone would have little effect on 
enterprise restructuring and performance in such a monopolized environment (Tirole 
1991, Konings, Van Cayseele, and Warzynski 2005). 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
data, and as already noted, the changes in employment in smaller firms play a larger role in the latter 
because of the growth of the small firm sector in TEs.   24
Evidence from previous studies concerning the evolution of the market structure and 
competition is incomplete and fragmented. While many studies have focused on the 
effect of market structure and competition on firm restructuring and performance (see, 
e.g., Aghion, Carlin and Schaffer 2002; Angelucci, Estrin, Konings, and Zolkiewski 
2002), little is known about changes and convergence in this aspect of business 
environment per se. Carlin, Estrin and Schaffer (2000) is one of the few exceptions that 
offers benchmarking of competition in the transition and market economies, using a 
survey sample of manufacturing firms in Poland, Romania and Spain.  
 
The BEEPS surveys contain several measures of competition.  The BEEPS market 
structure measure is the response to the question, “Thinking of your firm’s major product 
line or main line of services in the domestic market, how many competitors do you 
face?”, with 3 possible responses: none (monopoly); 1-3 (oligopoly or rivalry); 4 or more 
(competitive).  A measure of the price elasticity measure is captured by the response to 
the question, “If you were to raise your prices of your main product line or main line of 
services 10% above their current level in the domestic market, which of the following 
would best describe the result assuming that your competitors maintained their current 
prices?”, with 4 possible responses based on how the firm’s customers would respond, 
ranging from (1) customers would continue to buy the same quantities from the firm, to 
(4) customers would buy from the competition instead.  The BEEPS surveys also contain 
questions relating to the importance of import competition, and on the role of competition 
in spurring restructuring and innovation. 
 
We begin with market structure.  Table IV.1 shows the composition of the year and 
region samples according to the proportion stating the number of competitors they faced 
(none, 1-3, or 4+).  The degree of competition faced by firms in TEs (country groups III-
V) increased between 1999 and 2002, and in 2005, was similar to, though still slightly 
below that, faced by firms in the pre-2001 EU members (country groups I-II).  These 
results are robust to controlling for firm characteristics such as size and industry, and 
across country region.  The similar levels of competition in 2002 and 2005 in the TEs 
may be contaminated by a change in the way the question was asked (in 2005, firms were   25
asked separately about domestic and foreign markets).  The 2004 and 2005 BEEPS 
surveys asked a retrospective question about levels of competition faced three years 
earlier.  The responses suggest, if anything, a further catching-up of the TEs to levels of 
competition seen in the pre-2001 EU: of the firms that faced moderate competition in 
2002 (1-3 competitors), 34% in TEs stated they faced strong competition (4+ 
competitors) in 2005, vs. 22% in the pre-2001 EU; and of the firms that faced strong 
competition in 2002, 18% in TEs said they faced less competition in 2005, vs. 15% in the 
pre-2001 EU. 
 
A closer look at variation across country regions shows that firms generally reported an 
intensification of competition across all transition country regions between 2002 and 
2005.  The least competitive environment is reported by firms in the low-income CIS 
countries (V), whereas the most competitive environment is in the cohesion countries (II) 
and the EU8 members (III).  The fastest change in the market structure (towards more 
competition) is observed in the middle-income CIS countries (IVb) followed by the SEE 
countries (IVa) and low-income CIS countries (V).  The interpretation of this result is 
straightforward: (new) firms are filling in niches in markets characterized by low 
competition.  The data also show that the EU8 member states are fairly close to the 
cohesion countries in terms of market structure and market structure change. 
 
The price elasticity of demand data shows a somewhat different picture (Table IV.2).  
Over the entire 1999-2005 period, the overall degree of price elasticity is similar to what 
is seen in the pre-2001 EU countries.  However, the share of firms in TEs reporting 
inelastic demand grew between 1999 and 2005, and the share of firms facing highly 
elastic demand shrank.  The picture is therefore somewhat different from the degree of 
competition results: firms in TEs in 1999 faced elasticities of demand that were slightly 
higher than in the market economy benchmark (EU pre-2001), and in 2005 faced 
elasticities that were slightly lower than the benchmark. 
 
A possible explanation for this is that responses to questions about elasticity of demand 
are affected by the business cycle and business environment much more than estimates of   26
the number of competitors. In case of a negative shock, in the short term the number of 
competitors stays the same while demand drops, and the latter may be perceived as more 
elastic demand. This explanation is supported by two findings from the data.  First, firm-
reported capacity utilization (which is highly correlated with the business cycle) is 
correlated with firm-reported elasticity of demand, whereas there is no evidence of 
correlation between the number of competitors and capacity utilization.  Second, patterns 
at the country level suggest a relationship between macro performance and changes in the 
elasticity of demand. Uzbekistan', for example, has grown relatively slowly in recent 
years and is a country where demand has been becoming more elastic. On the other hand, 
in countries that grew reasonably fast, the reported elasticity has been falling (e.g., 
Russia, Ukraine). Thus, although market structure as measured by the number of 
competitors has become more competitive over the 1999-2005 period in transition 
economies, the substantial macro recovery in the region may be responsible for the 
reported falls in elasticity of demand faced by firms. 
 
We turn now to firms’ assessments of the “importance” of competition.  This is 
approached in several ways in the BEEPS survey.  Firms are asked about the importance 
of competition from imports in the market for their main product or service.  Separately, 
they are asked about the importance of pressure from customers and from foreign and 
domestic competitors for developing new products, services or markets, and for reducing 
production costs.  These latter measures are particularly relevant for this paper, since they 
measure the competitive pressures to engage in restructuring. 
 
Table IV.3 shows a now familiar pattern: the perceived level of competition from imports 
in transition countries (III-V) in 2002 and 2005 differs little from that in the developed 
EU market economies (I-II).  A closer look at country groups suggests that variations 
across regions are driven primarily by country size, i.e., the size of the domestic market 
and the scale of domestic competition.  Thus in 2005, 11-14% of firms in the cohesion 
countries (II), the EU8 members (III), the SEE countries (IVa), and the low income CIS 
countries (V) stated that competition from imports was high, whereas the figures for West 
Germany (I) and the middle-income CIS countries – most of which are Russian firms –   27
were 5% in both cases. A comparison of Russia, the largest transition economy, with 
other middle-income CIS countries is quite suggestive: while 51% of firms in Russia 
report insignificant pressure from imports, the figure is only 38% in the other middle-
income CIS countries. 
 
The pressure from foreign competition to restructure (Table IV.4) is also broadly similar 
in TEs and mature market economies, but there are significant differences across country 
groups.  The strongest pressure – and higher than that in Germany and the cohesion 
countries – is perceived by managers in the EU8 members (III) and in SEE (IVa).  By 
contrast, foreign competition is noticeably less of spur to restructuring in the CIS (IVb 
and V); these are countries that are physically more distant from the most important 
advanced market area (the EU), and where, since domestic productivity levels and 
product quality are low, domestic producers occupy niches are less exposed to 
international trade.  The difference between the low income CIS countries and Vietnam, 
another low-income country but where firms report very strong pressure from foreign 
competitors, is probably simply location: Vietnam shares a border and major trading links 
with China.  
 
In all regions, the surveyed firms stated pressure from domestic competitors and from 
customers is more important for restructuring.  Tables IV.5 and IV.6 show that these 
perceived domestic pressures to restructure are similar in the pre-2001 EU members (I 
and II) and in TEs overall (III-V).  The differences across regions are less pronounced 
than in perceive pressure from foreign competitors, but again, there is evidence that the 
competitive pressure to restructure is highest in the EU8 members (III) and lowest in the 
CIS countries (IVb-V); the SEE countries (IVa) are intermediate, with levels similar to 
those in the pre-2001 EU members.  Unlike the pressure from foreign competitors, which 
changed little between 1999 and 2005, these domestic pressures have been increasing in 
all groups of TEs. 
 
What we observe here can be interpreted as “convergence”, and the EU8 members are 
furthest along in this process, with the SEE and CIS countries following.  Foreign   28
competition was always there.  But initially, firms run into niches and avoid domestic 
competitions.  Early in the transition process, there aren’t many domestic firms that can 
challenge foreign competition.  As the economies mature, however, there is more 
successful home-grown competition, and so domestic competition indicators heat up.  
High quality imports were always there, but high quality domestic production is a new 
phenomenon. Another factor is that the industrial structure is changing rapidly in the TEs: 
the share of industry is falling while services are growing rapidly. Manufacturing firms 
faces more competition from abroad while many services are non-tradables. 
 
V.  Finance and financial constraints 
 
Access to external finance has long been regarded as an important aspect of the business 
environment crucial for the creation, survival and performance of firms. The 
entrepreneurship and finance literature in the developed market economies has long 
emphasized the existence of financial constraints implying the inability of firms to raise 
external financing in order to fund all desired investments (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989), Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)). It may be argued that financial 
constraints facing firms in the transition countries are much more severe than in the 
developed market economies, by virtue of the fact that financial markets did not exist 
during the era of central planning.  On the other hand, things may not be as simple as they 
appear at the first glance: it is well known that state-owned firms before the start of 
transition operated under so-called soft budget constraints.  The footprints of these SBCs 
have been found well after the start of the transition process. For example, using data 
from Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania covering 1994-1999, Konings, 
Rizov and Vandenbussche (2003) found greater financial constraints for firms in Poland 
and the Czech Republic than for firms in the less-financially-developed countries of 
Bulgaria and Romania. Such a cross-country pattern is explained by the persistence of 
SBCs in Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
Despite a growing number of studies in the field, few authors provide a comprehensive 
picture of the financial development of and financial constraints in the transition region.   29
Berglof and Bolton (2002), Bonin and Wachtel (2003), EBRD (2005) are among these 
few contributions. In this section of the paper our aim is to provide a broad picture by 
taking advantage of the cross-country and time-series nature of the BEEPS dataset. How 
has the transition process changed this important aspect of the business environment? 
How do the transition countries compare with the developed market economies? These 
are the questions that are addressed in this section.  
 
The BEEPS surveys are very rich in questions on access to and cost of finance, 
relationships with lenders, financial problems of firms, etc.  The BEEPS data show, for 
example, that when firms are asked about access to and cost of finance, firms in the pre-
2001 EU members have fewer problems than those in TEs, but the problems reported by 
firms in TEs have been declining since 1999, particularly in the SEE and CIS countries.  
In TEs, large firms, firms in major cities, and foreign-owned firms all face lower 
obstacles to obtaining finance than other firms.  The pattern in the developed market 
economies is similar, with an interesting exception: firms in large cities in Germany and 
the cohesion countries do not report financing obstacles that are any different to those in 
smaller cities or rural areas.  We take this as evidence of incomplete within-country 
integration in the transition economies.  In these countries, the large cities grow and 
catch-up faster than the rest of the country, and the poorer areas lag behind, whereas the 
developed market economies are financially integrated internally. Similar patterns have 
been found in previous studies, e.g., EBRD (2005).  
 
The picture painted by the more quantitative data is similar: privatized and new private 
firms in TEs have lower costs of credit than state-owned firms; small firms pay more; 
exporters and firms in big cities pay less.  We also find that the terms of loans are, not 
surprisingly, longer in Germany (I) and the cohesion countries (II), followed by the EU8 
members (III); and that the costs of loans have been declining in TEs between 1999 and 
2005, and are approaching the levels seen in Germany and the cohesion countries.  In 
short, we again see a pattern of convergence. 
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The focus of this paper is on restructuring and growth, however, and so we are 
particularly interested in how this is enabled, or not, by financial institutions.  We 
therefore focus on the structure of financing of firms. 
 
Table V.1 presents a snapshot of the sources of finance for fixed investment by firms in 
the BEEPS surveys in 2004-05. By far the largest source of financing is retained 
earnings, in all regions.  This is a standard finding in the literature (see e.g., Mayer (1988, 
1990) for an early discussion). More significant are the cross-country differences.  West 
Germany (I) stands out from the cohesion countries (II) as country where dependence on 
internal financing is somewhat lower, though the differences are not huge: roughly 50% 
of total financing in Germany is via retained earnings, vs. 60% in the cohesion countries.  
The difference is due to formal capital markets: not just bank financing (23% vs. 20%) 
but equity offers (10% vs. 3%).  The EU8 members (III) resemble the cohesion countries 
in both the reliance on retained earnings and on formal capital markets (though division 
between equity offers and bank financing puts more weight on the former).  Reliance on 
retained earnings and on capital markets is clearly related to level of income and 
economic development: the former increases, and the latter decreases, as we move from 
the richest to the poorest country groups.  Interestingly, the role of state bank financing is 
small and if anything, smaller in the transition economies than in the developed market 
economies.  State banks do not appear to be a major conduit for the soft budget 
constraint, at least for most firms. 
 
More surprising is the time trend in the TEs.  Table V.2 shows that the transition 
economies have not been converging to levels of reliance on retained earnings that are 
observed in the mature EU economies; on the country, in all groups of transition 
countries, firms were on average more reliant on retained earnings in 2005 than in 1999.  
The data in the table do not suggest that formal capital markets have been shrinking in 
TEs; as the simple means in the table show, reliance on bank and equity financing has 
been fairly stable over this period.  (Bank financing from state banks cannot be separately    
identified in 1999, but the figures for 2002 are small and slightly below those reported in 
Table V.1 for 2005.)  The biggest change has apparently been a move away from   31
informal finance: loans from family, friends, money lenders or other informal sources.  It 
is possible that increasing reliance on retained profit represents not a decline in the 
institutions of formal finance, but an increase in the level of development – a maturation 
– of the financial sector and/or the business sector itself. 
 
We explore these issues using regression analysis in Tables V.3 and V.4.  Table V.3 
analyzes the relationship between firm characteristics and financing shares for our 
benchmark market economies.  Explanatory variables (characteristics) include ownership, 
export activity, location, size, and sector dummies.  For consistency of interpretation 
across BEEPS surveys, bank financing includes state banks; the state financing that is 
separately identified is non-bank financing, e.g., grants and subsidies.  The table shows, 
not surprisingly, that larger firms borrow more from banks and rely less on retained 
earnings; for bank financing, the coefficient on log employment is about 0.03, implying 
that an increase of employment from 50 to 500 would mean an increase in the share of 
bank financing of about 7 percentage points (=0.03*ln(10)).  Foreign-owned firms rely 
less (about 10 percentage points) on bank financing and correspondingly more on 
retained earnings, presumably because foreign owners have “deep pockets”; the 
adjustments by foreign owners probably appear under retained earnings rather than equity 
because equity injections are made on an irregular/long-term basis.  Exporters rely more 
on external financing (about 5 percentage points for bank borrowing and equity 
combined). 
 
Table V.4 reports the same regression analysis using the 2005 BEEPS sample of TEs. In 
this initial formulation, we employ ownership dummies for new private and state-owned 
firms (the base category is privatized firms) but constrain the coefficients on explanatory 
variables to be the same across all types of firms.  The results are qualitatively similar: 
larger firms rely more on external financing and less on retained earnings; foreign owned 
firms rely less on external financing, again presumably because their owners have deep 
pockets; exporters rely more on external financing.  The ownership dummies are 
suggestive: state-owned firms, ceteris paribus, rely more on state financing and less on 
bank financing.  But here we have a problem, because ceteris may not be paribus: it may   32
not be reasonable to assume that the relationship between firm characteristics and 
borrowing is the same across ownership categories. 
 
The same questions, in fact, apply to the time trends noted above.  What is the source of 
the increased reliance on retained earnings of firms in TEs?  Is it because of changing 
sample characteristics (size, sector, etc.)?  Or because the relationship between 
characteristics and borrowing has changed?  Or has it been an autonomous change, 
unrelated to characteristics of firms? 
 
The decomposition approach is again a natural approach to addressing these issues.  
Applied here, the method consists of identifying two samples of firms.  The regression 
relating financing shares to firm characteristics is estimated for the two samples for a 
particular category of financing.  The decomposition then separates the total difference in 
financing shares into the amount attributable to “endowments” (firm characteristics); 
coefficients (the relationship between characteristics and financing); and the shift 
coefficient (the “unexplained” or “autonomous” difference between the two categories).
11 
 
We apply the decomposition to the following: 
  Private sector firms in developed market economies vs. private sector firms in 
transition economies in 2005. 
  Privatized vs. state-owned firms in TEs in 2005. 
  Privatized vs. new private firms in TEs in 2005. 
  New private firms in TEs in 2005 vs. 1999. 
  Privatized firms in TEs in 2005 vs. 1999. 
  State-owned firms in TEs in 2005 vs. 1999. 
In each case, we decompose the total difference in the share of financing via a particular 
source into the amount attributable to characteristics (endowments, E), coefficients (C) 
and the remainder (the dummy variable defining the first-named group of firms).  Each 
cell in the main part of the table reports both the total amount attributable to a particular 
characteristic, as well as the amount into E+C (underneath, in parentheses).  The subtotal   33
row is the total attributable to measured characteristics (E+C).  We also provide, for 
information, two additional rows giving the raw means for the two groups of firms (the 
difference is the amount to be explained, in the “Total” row); and two additional columns 
giving the mean characteristics (endowments) for the two groups of firms.  The 
explanatory variables are size (log L), location (a “big city” dummy), export activity 
(dummy variable), majority foreign ownership (dummy variable), and sector dummies.  
The treatment of sector dummies is different – for reporting purposes, manufacturing is 
chosen as a benchmark category and the “Sector” row reports the total decomposition for 
non-manufacturing vs. manufacturing.  The results are based on fixed-effects regressions 
with country dummies. 
 
We begin with Table V.5, which reports the decomposition applied to our basic 
benchmarking question: how do firms in transition economies (TEs) differ from firms in 
developed market economies (DMEs) in 2005?  The base category is TEs, so the 
differences are what make DMEs different from TEs.  The “DME mean E” and “TE 
mean E” columns show that the two sample of firms do differ significantly in basic 
characteristics: the TE firms are substantially larger (employment is about 35% higher); 
are less concentrated in manufacturing than the DME sample; and are more likely to be 
found in big cities.  The big difference between the two groups of firms is the lower 
reliance of DMEs on retained earnings (14.2 percentage points) and the higher use of 
bank credit (7.6 percentage points).  It turns out that these raw differences reported in the 
“Total” row are only modestly different from those in the “Region (DME dummy)” row, 
which is the difference between the groups after account for the impact of different 
endowments E and coefficients C.  The biggest single identifiable impact is size: 
although the smaller size of the DME firms make them slightly more likely to rely on 
retained earnings (1.8 percentage points), this is reversed by the smaller (in absolute 
value) negative size effect for DMEs.  But this is dwarfed by the large shift coefficients 
that remain after accounting for measurable characteristics: firms in TEs rely more on 
retained earnings (9.1 percentage points), more on family and informal sources (5.6), and 
less on bank financing (-6.6) and other sources (-6.7).  The fact that the differences 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 We used Ian Watson’s (2005) “decomp” addin for Stata for the decompositions in this section.   34
attributable to coefficients is small is itself interesting, because it is evidence of 
convergence: the relationship between characteristics and financing is similar in TEs and 
DMEs. 
 
Table V.6 applies the decomposition to privatized and state-owned firms in TEs in 2005.  
The big difference in financing source in the raw means in the “Total” row is that 
privatized firms rely much more on bank financing (10.8 percentage points) and less on 
state financing (-11.7 percentage points) than SOEs.  Interestingly, this is not driven by 
autonomous or unexplained changes – rather, it is attributable to sector and size, and in 
particular to coefficient rather than endowment effects.  Thus the size-bank borrowing 
relationship is steeper for privatized firms than for SOEs, and inspection of the 
regressions on which the decomposition is based (not reported here) shows that bigger 
privatized firms borrow more from banks, but bigger SOEs do not.  Most of the 
difference in state financing, meanwhile, is a coefficient effect driven by the greater 
likelihood of state-owned manufacturing firms to get state financing than privatized 
manufacturing firms. 
 
Privatized and new private firms in TEs in 2005 are compared in Table V.7.  Here, the 
main finding is a null result: the structure of financing before and after decomposition is 
very similar for privatized and new private firms.  The biggest difference, not 
surprisingly, is in the impact of size: privatized firms are, on average, considerably larger 
than the new private firms in the sample, with a positive impact on their bank financing 
and a negative impact on financing from retained earnings (both relating to new private 
firms).  The surprise in the table is the absence of a difference in the use of informal 
financing: privatized and new private firms are roughly equally likely to use it. 
 
The last three tables, V.8-10, show how the structure of financing has evolved over time 
for the three ownership categories of firms in TEs, and allow us to address directly the 
issue raised above about the apparent increasing reliance of firms in TEs on retained 
earnings.  In Table V.8, we see that privatized firms have increased financing from banks 
and decreased it from suppliers, in both cases in ways largely unrelated to observed   35
characteristics (“autonomous” change).  The results for new private firms in Table V.9 
are more striking.  The “Total” row shows that the main change has been for new private 
firms to rely less on informal financing (-8.2 percentage points) and more on retained 
earnings (+9.8).  Interestingly, in both cases the autonomous shifts are larger still (-18.2 
and +17.9 percentage points respectively) but these are offset by large coefficient effects 
relating to size.  Since the coefficient effects for new private firms in 2005 differ little 
from those for privatized firms, and together these differ little from private firms in 
DMEs, we have a double convergence story: new private firms have become more like 
privatized firms and DME firms in terms of how their characteristics relate to financing, 
and new private firms have “matured” in the sense that they rely less on family and 
informal financing (perhaps relating to start-up) and more on retained earnings, like 
privatized firms.  Lastly, the results in Table V.10 for SOEs provide evidence for the 
hardening of budget constraints in the region.  The big change for SOEs has been the 
decline in the share of state financing (-13.3 percentage points).  Interestingly, the 
autonomous decline has been even larger (a remarkable -22.7 percentage points), offset 
by increases relating to endowments (sector, location and export activity).  Our 
interpretation is that soft budget constraints, or stated financing more generally, has 
become more selective and more targeted.  The decrease in state financing has been made 
up by a corresponding increase in retained earnings, roughly equally explained by an 
autonomous increase of 10.2 percentage points and an increase of 7.9 percentage points.   
 
VI.  Deep Restructuring 
 
The early literature on enterprise restructuring in transition economies distinguishes 
between “defensive” restructuring on the one hand, and “deep”, “proactive” or “strategic” 
restructuring on the other (Grosfeld and Roland, 1996).  The early transition period was 
defined by large-scale defensive restructuring, as state-owned firms shed labor, controlled 
costs, discontinued product lines which were no longer in demand and tried to maintain 
sales of their remaining products.  While this was happening, new private firms were 
starting up.  These new firms were, almost by definition, engaged in activities that merit   36
the term “deep restructuring” – introducing new products and process, finding new 
markets for their goods, supported by significant investment. 
 
The BEEPS surveys start in 1999, after the end of the transformational recession and the 
period of large-scale defensive restructuring by firms.  Most of the region has 
experienced an economic recovery during the period covered by the surveys.  Actions by 
firms that would have earlier been described as part of the defensive restructuring process 
intrinsic to the transition process are better thought of as the lower tail of the distribution 
of firm-level growth.  This section therefore focuses on deep restructuring activities.   
 
The BEEPS surveys are rich in measures of restructuring and innovation activity.  
However, many of these measures are hard to use because of calibration problems.  If 
30% of the sample of firms in a country introduce a new product, is this high or low?  By 
benchmarking against what is observed in market economies, we can answer this 
question.  We are also interested in measuring the pace of restructuring activity in TEs 
over time.  The scale of misallocation of capital at the start of transition was enormous, 
meaning that there were many profitable market niches, large and small, for firms to 
move into.  As transition progressed and the scale of the initial misallocation moved 
further into the past, the size and number of these profit opportunities would have 
decreased.  One hypothesis we will explore is whether the scale of restructuring activity 
in TEs has been declining and approaching the levels observed in DMEs.  We will also 
use the BEEPS data to explore the determinants of restructuring activity.  We are 
interested in particular in the relationship between certain features of the business 
environment – in particular, competition, finance and ownership – and restructuring 
activity. 
 
The BEEPS measures of restructuring activity that we use are, for each firm, indicators of 
whether the firm: 
 
1.  developed successfully a major new product line/service in the 36 months prior to 
the survey;   37
2.  upgraded an existing product line/service in the 36 months prior to the survey; 
3.  obtained a new product licensing agreement in the prior 36 months; 
4.  obtained a new quality accreditation (such as ISO 9000) in the prior 36 months; 
5.  discontinued of at least one product line in the prior 36 months. 
 
We also define two composite indexes: 
 
6.  the average of new product (1/0) and upgrade (1/0); 
7.  the average of new product (1/0), upgrade (1/0), new licensing (1/0), new 
accreditation (1/0). 
 
The first measure, introducing a new product line, is the “deepest” of these deep 
restructuring measures, and is our preferred measure of deep restructuring.  Measure 5, 
discontinuation of a product line, is often used as an indicator of defensive restructuring, 
but it is also associated with proactive restructuring; reorientation of product lines by 
firms often simultaneous exit from some markets with entry into others.  We therefore 
include this measure in our analysis here, and the other frequently used measure of 
defensive restructuring, employment downsizing, is considered as part of growth in next 
section. 
 
Table VI.1 presents the shares of the samples by region and country that engaged in the 
two main indicators of deep restructuring, introducing a new product and upgrading an 
existing product, as well as the measure capturing the discontinuation of products.  First, 
it is immediately apparent that the scale of restructuring activity, as expected, is as high 
or higher in transition countries than in the mature market economies.  The difference is 
most apparent in the introduction of new products, where the percentage of firms that 
have engaged in this activity is about 10 percentage points higher in the TEs (III-V) than 
in Germany and the cohesion countries (I-II). This is not a surprise: the share of micro 
firms is 46% in Germany and 56% in the cohesion group, but 25-28% in the CIS 
countries, and smaller firms innovate less since they have, for example, fewer products 
and fewer product lines.  The more frequent introduction of new products in TEs is   38
consistent with the hypothesis earlier – firms in TEs will do this more frequently as 
transition progresses and they catch up to the developed market economies.  Again, we 
see a pattern of catching up and convergence.  The gap is smaller or nonexistent with 
respect to upgrading.  Interestingly, in 2005 there is virtually no variation across 
countries in terms of discontinuation of products: 15-17% of firms in Germany, the 
cohesion EU countries, and all the transition countries, report that they had discontinued 
a product in previous years.  The exception is East Germany, which reports considerably 
lower levels of restructuring activity than observed in firms in West Germany or 
anywhere else. 
 
The second pattern in the data is more of a surprise.  The raw data show an inverse U-
shape pattern of restructuring in the transition countries between 1999 and 2005: 
restructuring activity is low in 1999, high in 2002, and lower again in 2005.  The other 
measures of restructuring available in the BEEPS surveys produce similar results (with 
the sole exception of “obtained a new quality accreditation”).  To check the robustness of 
this finding, we estimated a restructuring activity equation (see below) on the full set of 
three years of data, including all the controls that we use below (firm size, sector, 
ownership, etc.), in order to remove any effects of changes in the composition of the 
BEEPS survey samples.  The U-shape pattern appears strongly in these regression results 
(Table VI.2), across all the measures of restructuring we use, including the measure that 
captures both defensive as well as deep restructuring: discontinuation of product lines in 
the TEs peaks in 2002.  The U-shape pattern extends across transition country regions as 
well. 
 
This pattern is puzzling.  A U-shape pattern is consistent with the literature on 
restructuring discussed earlier: if the early transition period is dominated by defensive 
restructuring, the opposite side of the coin is that deep restructuring starts with a lag and 
then accelerates.  But why should the timing of the peak of restructuring activity in the 
new EU member states coincides with the one in middle income and low income CIS 
countries? It is widely believed that the more developed transition countries were faster 
reformers at the start of the transition period, and, hence, more restructuring activity in   39
these countries would have occurred at the start of the transition process. In contrast, the 
less developed countries, which are normally also slow reformers, postponed many 
reforms that drive enterprise restructuring; so one would expect that the peak of 
restructuring activity in less advanced countries occurs later than in more advanced 
countries.  A possible explanation for this observed pattern in the BEEPS data is as 
follows.  Most of the firms in the survey are SMEs from the new private sector.  The 
pattern in the extent of deep restructuring in the BEEPS data is therefore largely driven 
by the extent of this activity among these firms.  The pattern we observe suggests that 
this activity peaked in new private sector SMEs about 10-12 years after the start of 
transition.  This could be either because of a standard pattern in new firm development, 
since the start of transition and the beginning of new private sector growth was 
synchronized across TEs, or because of the largely common timing of the 
transformational recession and the resumption of growth in TEs. 
 
We turn now to regression analysis, and explaining the relationship between observed 
restructuring and the economic environment in particular.  The early waves of BEEPS 
(1999 and 2002) are not very well suited to investigate the effect of competition in 
particular. A fundamental problem is that most measures of competition in the survey are 
contemporaneous, while restructuring refers to the period spanning three years before the 
survey. This is true of the market structure variables (number of competitors), price 
elasticity of demand, competition from imports, and indicators of pressure from 
competitors and customers for developing new products. In other words, competition is 
measured after restructuring activities have been undertaken, so it is difficult to establish 
a causal link from competition to restructuring (unless market structure is more or less 
stable). One may proceed under the assumption that market structure does not change 
much over three year periods, but the assumption is questionable at least.  Attempts to 
estimate simple regressions with restructuring measures on the LHS and ownership and 
competition variables on the right-hand side (plus controls such as firm size, industry, 
location) show that it is very difficult to establish any robust result with respect to 
competition.  Fortunately, the latest wave of BEEPS (2005) suffers less from this 
problem, because firms were also asked retrospective questions about number of   40
competitors three years before the survey. We therefore focus on the results using the 
2005 data only;  by using lagged values available in 2005 we can somewhat mitigate the 
endogeneity problem as applied to the market structure variables, but not others such as 
elasticity of demand and various pressures. 
 
We use the 4-component index of deep restructuring; the results are similar using other 
measures.  The regressions are reported separately for all groups of countries, including 
the pre-2001 EU members Germany and the cohesion countries.  The explanatory 
variables include measures of ownership (state-owned and privatized; the omitted 
category is new private), size (log employment), location (big city dummy), number of 
competitors (omitted category is 1-3 competitors), price elasticity of demand (omitted 
category is highly price elastic), pressure to innovate from domestic competitors, foreign 
competitors, customers, and sector and country dummies.  The results are shown in 
Table VI.3. 
 
First, as should be expected, larger firms are more likely to have engaged in more deep 
restructuring measures than smaller firms.  The impact of size is found in all country 
groups, including the developed market economies, and the magnitude of the impact is 
about the same in all.  The ownership variables show that in TEs, not surprisingly, state-
owned firms are less active than new private firms; privatized firms are less active than 
new private firms as well, but if anything more active than state-owned firms.  The 
differences are not, however, huge: the coefficient on the SOE dummy ranges from about 
-0.07 to about -0.16.  The index is an average of 4 measures and take the values of 0 to 1. 
Although SOEs in TEs have engaged in less deep restructuring than private firms, they 
are not simply “dinosaurs”.  The absence of any measurable ownership effects in 
Germany and the cohesion countries is due simply to the very small number of privatized 
and state-owned firms in the samples for these countries. 
 
The most interesting results relate to the role of competition.  First, we find no significant 
impact of market structure on restructuring.  As suggested by Carlin, Schaffer and 
Seabright (2004), this null result may stem from the endogeneity of market structure.    41
Thus their study using BEEPS 1999 showed that there was an impact of competition in 
CIS countries, where market structure had not yet adjusted, and not in CEE countries, 
where they hypothesize is had.  We are looking at 2005, and the null result of the impact 
of market structure may be the result of market structure in CIS countries adjusting – 
another sign of convergence.  We note here that our results are robust to formulation in 
terms of lagged or current market structure.  
 
The impact of the elasticity of demand on restructuring is a priori ambiguous.  On the one 
hand, facing highly elastic demand is associated with a very competitive market 
environment, and if competition promotes restructuring, then we should observe a 
correlation between restructuring activity and elastic demand.  On the other hand, 
inelastic demand may be driven by temporary monopoly that is the result of successful 
innovation, or the profits that result from monopoly can be used to finance restructuring.  
What we observe in both TEs and the developed market economies is that the latter 
channels predominate: highly elastic demand (the omitted category) is associated with 
less deep restructuring.  (There is also a hint of a U-shape relationship in some of the 
results, with less restructuring found in monopolistic environments, but these results rely 
on the small number of firms reporting such a market structure and are not very robust.) 
 
Finally, deep restructuring is clearly associated with perceived pressures to innovate.  
This is true across all regions, and in both the developed market economies and the TEs.  
Interestingly, the source of pressure apparently varies systematically across groups of 
countries.  In particular, in both Germany and the cohesion countries, competitive 
pressure from domestic competitors is a spur to deep restructuring, whereas it has 
generally no such impact in the TEs, where the pressure comes exclusively from either 
foreign competition or customers.  This is consistent with TEs as followers: in the 
developed market economies, the domestic competition is perceived as more of a 
competitive threat than it is in the less developed TEs. 
 
We conclude this section with an examination of whether deep restructuring is associated 
with external financing.  Simple correlations suggest a connection: measures of external   42
financing, either obtained (e.g., the sources of financing for fixed investment) or 
perceived (e.g., cost of or access to finance as an obstacle to business) are positively 
correlated with deep restructuring, however measured.  We then use the same 
methodology as above – regression analysis with controls for firm characteristics – but 
now we include a measure of external financing.  We use two different measures: 
whether or not the firm has a bank loan, and whether or not the firm has any external 
financing.  The results are presented in Table VI.4 for specifications that pool the pre-
2001 EU members and the TEs, using our index of the two main restructuring measures 
(new product and upgrade); the results are similar when we use different measures of 
deep restructuring.  The absence of external financing, either partial (no bank borrowing) 
or complete (not external financing at all) is associated with less restructuring.  The 
impact of access to external financing is, interesting, quantitatively as qualitatively very 
similar in both the developed market economies of the pre-2001 EU members and in the 
TEs. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
The move from plan to market in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR was 
to a large extent driven by the expectation that the return to the market would put these 
countries onto a growth path that would lead eventually to convergence with the 
developed market economies operating at the world technological frontier. Fifteen years 
after the start of the transition process, it is the right time to ask if such convergence has 
indeed been taking place. Most studies of convergence focus either on the macro aspect 
(convergence in terms of per capita GDP) or the micro aspect (convergence in firm 
productivity). In contrast, this paper looks at the function of, and convergence in, markets 
and firm behavior of the transition countries with those in the mature market economies. 
Our focus is on competition and market structure, finance and the structure of lending to 
firms, and how firms respond to the economic environment by restructuring. 
  
We use data from several waves of the BEEPS exercise; due to a number of unique 
features, these data are particularly appropriate for studying the process of convergence   43
in the transition economies.  The BEEPS consist of a series of 3 snapshots of virtually all 
transition economies in 1999, 2002 and 2005 and covers random and representative 
samples from these countries. In addition, its last wave contains firm level data from a 
number of developed market economies, which makes it possible to directly benchmark 
TEs against these economies.  
 
Our analysis of firm growth, sectoral changes and changes in size distribution of firms 
provides a clear picture of the convergence process.  Overall, the BEEPS data show a 
faster growth of firms in the TEs compared with the developed market economies.  The 
pattern of growth at the country, sectoral and firm level shows more rapid growth in the 
private and especially new private sectors, movement in the size distribution of firms 
towards the pattern of large numbers of small firms as seen in developed market 
economies, more evidence of convergence in the new EU members than in the poorer 
TEs, as well as evidence of Kuznet-Chenery type structural change across sectors. 
 
We see clear signs of convergence of the TEs to the developed market economies of the 
EU across the two dimensions of the business environment that we investigate in detail, 
competition and finance.  In terms of competition and market structure, the EU8 
members are furthest along in this process, with the SEE and CIS countries following.  
We offer an interpretation in terms of an initial move by firms into niches to exploit local 
market power and avoid domestic competition.  Later in transition, there is more entry 
and domestic competition becomes stronger.  In finance, there is again clear signs of 
convergence, albeit incomplete.  We find some evidence that the gaps may be related to 
within-country duality in TEs (developed urban vs. undeveloped rural) that we do not 
observe to the same degree in the developed EU countries.  Our decomposition analysis 
suggests that structure of financing received by firms in TEs is related to the observed 
characteristics, and the main difference remaining between TEs and developed market 
economies is a lower autonomous reliance on bank financing in the former (unrelated to 
observable firm characteristics) and correspondingly higher reliance on retained earnings.  
The increasing reliance on retained earnings in TEs that we observe in the BEEPS 
surveys over time is not a sign of reversal; rather, it represents a “maturation” of the   44
business sector, as new private firms rely less on informal and family sources of finance 
and more on retained earnings, to a similar extent observed in privatized firms in TEs.  
The other major trend over time has been the large decline in state financing of SOEs, 
which we take as a sign of harder budget constraints.  
 
The analysis of restructuring and innovation activity shows that the scale of these 
processes is as high or higher in the TEs as in the DMEs, in line with convergence 
patterns. We also find, somewhat unexpectedly, an inverse U-shape pattern of 
restructuring in the transition countries between 1999 and 2005, with the peak of 
restructuring occurring in 2002 and not in 1999 or 2005. We relate this finding either to 
the standard pattern of firm development (most sampled firms are new private firms, 
established after the collapse of socialism) or to the largely common timing of 
transformational recession and the resumption of growth in TEs. With respect to 
ownership, our analysis suggests that state-owned firms are the least active in 
restructuring and innovation activities, followed by privatized enterprises and new private 
firms. We did not find any significant effect of market structure on restructuring. This 
may be related to the fact that the market structure, an exogenous factor at the start of 
transition, has already adjusted to the market environment in most of the TEs, suggesting 
convergence. Our results, however, suggest that highly elastic demand is associated with 
less restructuring of firms. Finally, the BEEPS data provide evidence that restructuring is 
positively associated with external financing. The impact of access to external financing 
is, interestingly, quantitatively as qualitatively very similar in both the developed market 
economies of the pre-2001 EU members and in the TEs. 
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Figure III.1  
Decomposition of Aggregate Employment Growth:
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Figure III.3 
Decomposition of Aggregate Employment Growth:
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Figure III.5 
Decomposition of Aggregate Employment Growth:
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Figure III.7 
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TABLES 
 
Table II.1:  BEEPS composition by firm size 
Firm  size  1999 2002 2004 2005 Total 
Micro  1093 2241 1569 4145 9048   
% 26.68 33.77 46.89 38.53 36.43 
Small  905  2242 1038 3499 7684   
% 22.09 33.79 31.02 32.52 30.94 
Medium  1171 1126 362  1873 4532   
% 28.58 16.97 10.82 17.41 18.25 
Large  928 1027  377 1242  3574   
% 22.65 15.48 11.27 11.54 14.39 
Total 4097 6636 3346 10759  24838   
% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: Firm size categories are defined on the basis of employment, micro (1-9 
employees), small (10-49), medium (50-199) and large (200+ employees). 
The table shows the number of firms in each size category as well as the 
percentage of firms in the respective category in each wave of the survey. 
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Table II.2:  BEEPS composition by country (number of firms sampled) 
Country  1999 2002 2004 2005 Total 
Albania  163 170    204 537 
Armenia  125 171    351 647 
Azerbaijan  137 170    350 657 
Belarus  132 250    325 707 
Bosnia&Herzegovina  192 182    200 574 
Bulgaria  130 250    300 680 
Croatia  127 187    236 550 
Czech  Republic  149 268    343 760 
Estonia  132 170    219 521 
Georgia  129 174    200 503 
Germany     1197  1197 
   West      811     
   East      386     
Greece     546  546 
Hungary 147  250    610  1007 
Ireland      501  501 
Kazakhstan 147  250  585  982 
Korea     598  598 
Kyrgyzstan  132 173    202 507 
Latvia  166 176    205 547 
Lithuania  112 200    205 517 
Macedonia 136  170  200  506 
Moldova  139 174    350 663 
Poland 246  500    975  1721 
Portugal     505  505 
Romania  125 255    600 980 
Russia 552  506    601  1659 
Serbia&Montenegro   250  300  550 
Slovakia  138 170    220 528 
Slovenia  125 188    223 536 
Spain      606  606 
Tajikistan   176  200  376 
Turkey 150  514    557  1221 
Ukraine 247  463    594  1304 
Uzbekistan  126 260    300 686 
Vietnam     500  500 
Total  4104 6667 3346  10762  24879 
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Table II.3: GNI per capita in the BEEPS countries 
Country 















Tajikistan 280  280  LI  LI     
Kyrgyz Republic  300  400  LI  LI    
Vietnam 370  550  LI  LI     
Moldova 410  710  LI  LI     
Azerbaijan 460  950  LI  LMI  ↑ 
Armenia 490  1120  LI  LMI  ↑ 
Georgia 620  1040  LI  LMI  ↑ 
Turkmenistan 670  1340  LI  LMI  ↑ 
Uzbekistan 720  460  LI  LI     
Ukraine 840  1260  LMI  LMI     
Albania 930  2080  LMI  LMI     
Bosnia&Herzegovina 1210  2040 LMI  LMI     
Kazakhstan 1250  2260  LMI  LMI     
Bulgaria 1410  2740  LMI  LMI     
Romania 1470  2920  LMI  LMI     
Macedonia, FYR  1660  2350 LMI  LMI     
Russian Federation  2250  3410  LMI  UMI  ↑ 
Latvia 2430  5460  LMI  UMI  ↑ 
Belarus 2620  2120  LMI  LMI     
Lithuania 2640  5740  LMI  UMI  ↑ 
Turkey 2900  3750  LMI  UMI  ↑ 
Estonia 3400  7010  UMI  UMI     
Slovak Republic  3770  6480  UMI  UMI    
Poland 4070  6090  UMI  UMI     
Croatia 4530  6590  UMI  UMI     
Hungary 4640  8270  UMI  UMI     
Czech Republic  5020  9150  UMI  UMI    
Korea, Rep.  8490  13980  UMI  HI  ↑ 
Slovenia 10000  14810  HI  HI     
Portugal 11030  14350  HI  HI     
Greece 12110  16610  HI  HI     
Spain 14800  21210  HI  HI     
Ireland 21470  34280  HI  HI     
Germany 25620  30120  HI  HI     
Serbia&Montenegro n/a  2620  LMI  LMI     
Note: data from the World Bank. LI stands for low-income countries with GNI per capita less than 
826 (755 in 1999), LMI stands for lower middle income countries with GNI per capita more than 
826 (755 in 1999) but less than 3,256 (2,995 in 1999), UMI stands for upper middle-income 
economies with GNI per capita more than 3,256 (2,995 in 1999), but less than 10066 (9266 in 1999), 
and HI denote high income economies with GNI per capita more than 10,066 (9,266 in 1999). 
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Table III.1:  Balance between growing and shrinking firms (share of sample) by 
country group 
 Sales  Employment 
Country  group  1999 2002 2005 1999 2002 2005 
I.      W. Germany      0.051      -0.130 
II.     Cohesion      0.297      0.159 
III.        EU8  0.321 0.282 0.277 0.054 0.059 0.064 
IVa.    SEE  0.223 0.267 0.246 0.188 0.221 0.153 
IVb.    Mid  inc  CIS  0.098 0.461 0.520 -0.009  0.245 0.223 
V.     Low inc CIS  -0.035  0.292  0.340  -0.137  0.118  0.208 
nb:  E  Germany    0.171    0.018 
 
 
Table III.2:  Balance between growing and shrinking firms (share of sample) by 
ownership type, TEs only 
 Sales  Employment 
Ownership  type  1999 2002 2005 1999 2002 2005 
State  0.101 0.270 0.323 -0.282  -0.164  -0.100 
Privatized  0.054 0.330 0.368 -0.322  -0.071  -0.142 
New  private  0.219 0.342 0.341 0.221 0.272 0.241 
    
 
Table III.3:  Job reallocation rate (JRR), job creation rate (JCR), job destruction 
rate (JDR) and job growth rate (JGR), by country group  
Country group 
 
JRR JCR  JDR  JGR  Obs. 
Developed market economies (2004/2005): 
W Germany  0.138  0.060  0.078  -0.018  810 
Cohesion 0.192  0.125  0.066  0.059  2,150 
Transition economies (2005): 
EU8 0.180  0.074  0.105  -0.031  2,946 
SEE 0.224  0.088  0.137  -0.049  1,762 
Mid inc CIS  0.191  0.116  0.075  0.041  2,080 
Low inc CIS  0.229 0.140  0.088  0.052  1,944 
Transition economies (2002): 
EU8 0.173  0.071  0.102  -0.030  1,885 
SEE 0.207  0.092  0.115  -0.023  1,249 
Mid inc CIS  0.190  0.137  0.053  0.084  1,458 
Low inc CIS  0.203  0.100  0.103  -0.003  1,285 
Transition economies (1999): 
EU8 0.193  0.062  0.131  -0.068  1,124 
SEE 0.167  0.053  0.115  -0.062  639 
Mid inc CIS  0.216  0.049  0.167  -0.118  1,039 
Low inc CIS  0.221  0.033  0.187  -0.154  750 
Note: Job creation rate (JCR) is defined as the sum of all employment gains in the expanding firms in the 
economy divided by total employment, job destruction rate (JDR) is the sum of all employment losses in 
the contracting firms divided by total employment, job reallocation rate (JRR) is the sum of the two 
(JCR+JDR) and job growth rate (JGR) is the difference between JCR and JDR.    60
Table IV.1: Market structure - number of competitors 
  None  1 to 3  4 or more  Sample size 
TEs  (III-IV-V)       
    1999  9.6  12.7  77.7  3,822 
    2002  1.4  16.9  81.7  5,845 
    2005  4.0  14.3  81.7  8,264 
Pre-2001 EU members (I-II)         
    2004-05  1.4  13.8  84.8  2,885 
 
 
Table IV.2: Price elasticity of demand 
  1 (Low)  2  3  4 (High)  Sample size 
TEs  (III-IV-V)       
    1999  14.3  25.2  25.0  35.5  3,718 
    2002  19.9  30.5  17.9  31.7  5,912 
    2005  22.5  30.6  18.5  28.7  8,647 
Pre-2001  EU  (I-II)       
    2004-05  15.5  26.7  26.3  31.5  2,921 
 
 
Table IV.3: Importance of foreign competition 
  1  (Low)  2 3 4  5  (High) n.a.  Sample  size 
TEs  (III-IV-V)          
    2002  29.7  13.1  22.6  19.1  9.9  5.7  5,920 
        2005  28.5 15.4 20.7 18.7 10.0  6.8  7,097 
Pre-2001  EU  (I-II)         
        2004-05  27.3 14.7 19.3 20.4 11.8  6.5  2,873 
Note: n.a. = not applicable; products can’t be imported. 
 
   61
Table IV.4: Pressure from foreign competitors 
  Pressure to develop new products  Pressure to reduce costs 
Country  group  1999 2002 2005 1999 2002 2005 
I.      W. Germany      1.85      1.90 
II.     Cohesion      2.03      2.03 
III.    EU8  2.34  2.20  2.21  2.28  2.14  2.19 
IVa.  SEE  2.29  2.16  2.23  2.29  2.14  2.23 
IVb.  Mid inc CIS  1.66  1.80  1.70  1.59  1.72  1.65 
V.     Low inc CIS  1.82  1.90  1.81  1.78  1.84  1.74 
Korea     1.69      1.69 
Vietnam     2.32      2.34 
Note: Evaluated on a scale from 1 to 4, not at all important (1), slightly important (2), fairly important (3), 
and very important (4).  
 
 
Table IV.5: Pressure from domestic competitors 
  Pressure to develop new products  Pressure to reduce costs 
Country group  1999  2002  2004/05  1999  2002  2004/05 
I.      W. Germany      3.08      3.06 
II.     Cohesion      2.87      2.81 
III.    EU8  2.84  3.02  3.10  2.77  2.96  3.05 
IVa.  SEE  2.84  2.74  2.97  2.83  2.68  2.94 
IVb.  Mid inc CIS  2.31  2.69  2.70  2.24  2.62  2.63 
V.     Low inc CIS  2.31  2.50  2.56  2.21  2.40  2.47 
Korea     2.65      2.63 
Vietnam     3.24      3.25 
Note: Evaluated on a scale from 1 to 4, not at all important (1), slightly important (2), fairly important (3), 
and very important (4).  
 
 
Table IV.6: Pressure from customers 
  Pressure to develop new products  Pressure to reduce costs 
Country group  1999  2002  2004/05  1999  2002  2004/05 
I.      W. Germany      3.07      2.91 
II.     Cohesion      3.12      2.98 
III.    EU8  3.01  3.16  3.28  2.87  3.05  3.20 
IVa.  SEE  2.65  2.92  3.10  2.57  2.81  3.00 
IVb.  Mid inc CIS  2.36  2.88  2.68  2.25  2.72  2.58 
V.     Low inc CIS  2.30  2.59  2.51  2.21  2.52  2.43 
Korea     2.74      2.70 
Vietnam     3.33      3.31 
Note: Evaluated on a scale from 1 to 4, not at all important (1), slightly important (2), fairly important (3), 
and very important (4).  
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Table V.1: Sources of financing, 2004-05 








Suppliers State  Other 
I.      W. Germany  49.1  9.7  23.0  3.9  0.6  4.5  0.2  12.7 
II.    Cohesion  61.3  2.6  20.0  3.1  1.1  2.7  0.6  11.6 
III.   EU8  63.0  6.4  13.7  2.8  2.2  1.6  1.1  11.4 
IVa. SEE  71.9  0.5  16.1  1.4  3.2  1.5  1.1  5.4 
IVb. Mid inc CIS  76.9  3.4  10.0  2.0  2.8  1.6  1.4  3.2 
V.    Low inc CIS  79.8  0.3  11.1  0.8  3.7  0.7  1.8  1.6 
 
 
Table V.2:  Evolution of financing, 1999-2005     
Country group  Retained earnings  Banks*  Family/informal 
 1999  2002  2004/05 1999  2002  2004/05 1999  2002  2004/05 
I.     W. Germany      49.1      23.0      0.6 
II.    Cohesion      61.3      20.0      1.3 
III.   EU8  49.1  61.6  63.0  13.6  13.5  13.7  9.3  3.3  3.0 
IVa.  SEE  63.8  73.5  71.9 6.8 9.4 16.1 9.6 6.4  3.5 
IVb. Mid inc CIS  67.3  76.6  76.9  5.9  6.8  10.0  6.5  6.4  3.7 
V.    Low inc CIS  67.5  77.1  79.8  4.3  5.8  11.1  10.2  7.4  4.8 
*Including state-owned banks.    63
 
Table V.3:  Regression results for share of financing. Developed economies, 2004-05 




earnings  Equity Banks  Equity and 
banks 
Family and 
informal  Suppliers State  Other 
Intercept  0.697** 0.049** 0.128** 0.177** 0.018**  0.016*  -0.002  0.094** 
  (0.026) (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.018) 
Foreign  owned  0.143**  -0.006  -0.10**  -0.106**  0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.034 
  (0.035) (0.012) (0.028) (0.029) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.021) 
Exporter -0.018  0.007  0.042  0.049*  -0.006  -0.003  0.002  -0.025 
  (0.026) (0.011) (0.022) (0.024) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.018) 
Big city dummy  0.003  0.002  -0.035*  -0.033  -0.005  -0.009  0.001  0.044** 
  (0.022) (0.008) (0.016) (0.018) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.014) 
Log employment  -0.048**  0.005*  0.028**  0.033**  -0.002  0.004*  0.001  0.012** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Sector  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq.  0.089 0.063 0.052 0.021 0.011 0.019 0.009 0.045 
Observations  2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: ** - significant at 
1%, * - significant at 5%. 
 
 
Table V.4:  Regression results for share of financing. Transition economies, 2005 




earnings  Equity Banks  Equity and 
banks 
Family and 
informal  Suppliers State  Other 
Intercept  0.819** 0.051** 0.058** 0.108** 0.065**  0.007  -0.016**  0.016 
  (0.020) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 
State-owned 0.013  -0.014  -0.097**  -0.110**  -0.020**  -0.003  0.115**  0.005 
  (0.023) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) 
New  private  -0.030*  -0.008 0.014 0.006 0.007 0.000  0.006*  0.012 
  (0.015) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) 
Foreign  owned 0.050** 0.002 -0.056**  -0.054**  -0.013** 0.008  -0.001  0.011 
  (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) 
Exporter -0.040**  0.003  0.027**  0.030**  -0.012**  -0.001  0.008*  0.015* 
  (0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Big city dummy  0.018  -0.001  -0.028**  -0.029**  0.005  -0.001  0.003  0.005 
  (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Log employment  -0.029**  -0.003  0.029**  0.027**  -0.009**  0.002  0.002  0.008** 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Sector  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq.  0.110 0.110 0.083 0.033 0.035 0.015 0.130 0.093 
Observations  6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 6300 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: ** - significant at 
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Table V.5:  Decomposition of share of financing. Private firms in transition 
economies (TEs) vs. developed market economies (DMEs) 2005 
Attributable to 
- Total 









Equity Bank  Family  + 
informal 
Suppliers State  Other 
- Size 















- Sector (vs. manuf.) 















- Big city 















- Foreign ownership 
































  (E+C) 














Region (DME dummy)     9.1 -0.6 -6.6 5.6 -0.9 0.0 -6.7 
Total     14.2  -1.8 -7.6 2.9 -1.9 0.0 -5.7 
Mean source – DME    57.2 5.2 21.0 1.0  3.3  0.3 12.0 
Mean source – TE    71.4  3.3  13.4  3.9 1.4 0.3 6.2 
 
 
Table V.6:  Decomposition of share of financing. Privatized vs. State-owned, 2005 
Attributable to 
- Total 









Equity Bank  Family  + 
informal 
Suppliers State  Other 
- Size 














- Sector (vs. manuf.) 














- Big city 














- Foreign ownership 






























  (E+C) 














Ownership (privatized)     -4.9 -0.7 -2.6 5.0  0.7  2.6 -0.2 
Total     -0.5 1.1 10.8 2.2 0.2  -11.7  -2.1 
Mean source – Prv    69.8  3.1  17.3  2.5 1.3 0.3 5.8 
Mean source – SOE    70.3 2.0  6.4  0.3  1.1 12.0 7.9 
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Table V.7:  Decomposition of share of financing. Privatized vs. New Private, 2005 
Attributable to 
- Total 









Equity Bank  Family  + 
informal 
Suppliers State  Other 
- Size 















- Sector (vs. manuf.) 















- Big city 















- Foreign ownership 
































  (E+C) 














Ownership (privatized)     -2.7 -1.5 2.0 -1.5 0.4  0.8  2.4 
Total     -1.9 -0.3 4.5 -1.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 
Mean source – Prv    69.8  3.1  17.3  2.5 1.3 0.3 5.8 




Table V.8:  Decomposition of share of financing.  Privatized, 2005 vs. 1999 
Attributable to 
- Total 









Equity Bank  Family  + 
informal 
Suppliers State  Other 
- Size 















- Sector (vs. manuf.) 















- Big city 















- Foreign ownership 
































  (E+C) 














Time (2005 dummy)     3.6  4.8  6.6 -5.3 -6.7 -1.0 -2.1 
Total     5.8 -1.4 7.4 -2.0 -4.4 -3.5 -2.0 
Mean source – 2005    69.8  3.1  17.3  2.5 1.3 0.3 5.8 
Mean source – 1999    63.9  4.5 9.8 4.5 5.8 3.7 7.7 
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Table V.9:  Decomposition of share of financing.  New private, 2005 vs. 1999 
Attributable to 
- Total 









Equity Bank  Family  + 
informal 
Suppliers State  Other 
- Size 















- Sector (vs. manuf.) 















- Big city 















- Foreign ownership 

















































Time (2005 dummy)      17.9 -1.0  2.5 -18.2 -1.2 -0.3  0.2 
Total      9.8 -3.1 4.9 -8.2 -3.5 -0.5 0.7 
Mean source – 2005    71.7  3.4  12.7  4.1 1.4 0.4 6.3 




Table V.10:  Decomposition of share of financing.  State-owned, 2005 vs. 1999 
Attributable to 
- Total 









Equity Bank  Family  + 
informal 
Suppliers State  Other 
- Size 















- Sector (vs. manuf.) 















- Big city 















- Foreign ownership 
































  (E+C) 














Time (2005 dummy)     10.2 1.8 16.3 -2.4 -5.7  -22.7 2.4 
Total     18.0 -1.2 -0.8 -0.9 -2.9  -13.3 1.1 
Mean source – 2005    70.3 2.0  6.4  0.3  1.1 12.0 7.9 
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Table VI.1:  Deep restructuring, 1999-2005 
  Percentage of firms reporting that they: 
Country group  Developed new product or 
service 
Upgraded existing product 
or service 
Discontinued a product 
line or service 
  1999  2002 2004/05 1999  2002 2004/05 1999  2002 2004/05 
I.      W. Germany      21      53      15 
II.     Cohesion      27      36      15 
III.    EU8  33  35  31  45  50  47  17  22  17 
IVa.  SEE  23  44  36  39  56  54  7  15  15 
IVb.    Mid  inc  CIS  33 41 38 36  53 56 16  21 15 
V.     Low inc CIS  24  36  38  24  47  45  13  23  15 
nb:    E. Germany      11      30      6 
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Table VI.2:  Determinants of deep restructuring in TEs 
Model:  1 2 3  4 




Intro new prod Discontinued 
prod line 
Intercept 0.081**  0.098**  0.077  -0.009 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.047)  (0.038) 
State  -0.085** -0.123** -0.128**  0.020 
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.014)  (0.011) 
Privatized  -0.037** -0.068** -0.087**  0.015 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)  (0.009) 
Log  employment  0.036** 0.040** 0.042**  0.018** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) 
Big city dummy  0.026**  0.030**  0.046**  0.016** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.006) 
No  competitors  -0.018 -0.013 -0.019  0.013 
  (0.011) (0.017) (0.021)  (0.017) 
>3 competitors  -0.003  -0.003  0.007  0.017* 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.008) 
Price  inelastic  0.045** 0.069** 0.066**  -0.017 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)  (0.009) 
Price slightly elastic  0.046**  0.073**  0.072**  0.004 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.008) 
Price elastic  0.020**  0.027**  0.026*  0.018* 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.008) 
Dom compet pressure  0.005*  0.012**  0.009*  0.006 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) 
Foreign compet press  0.016**  0.020**  0.019**  0.021** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) 
Customer  pressure  0.024** 0.035** 0.031**  0.015** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) 
Majority  foreign  ownership  -0.003 -0.009 -0.012  0.010 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.008) 
Exporter  dummy  0.069** 0.092** 0.096**  0.037** 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.008) 
1999  dummy    -0.075** -0.131** -0.115**  -0.085** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)  (0.010) 
2005  dummy    -0.035** -0.038** -0.056**  -0.050** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)  (0.008) 
Sector  dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
R-sq.  0.169 0.151 0.104  0.066 
Observations:  16,318 16,338 16,346  16,340 
Note: The dependent variables are: strategic restructuring 4-variables index in (1), strategic 
restructuring 2-variables index in (2), introduction of new product in (3), and discontinuation of at least 
one product line in (4). “Very elastic” is omitted price elasticity category. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: ** - significant at 1%, * - significant at 5%.   69
Table VI.3:  Determinants of restructuring in 2005, by country group 









Mid inc CIS 
(IVb) 
Low inc CIS 
(V) 
Intercept  -0.032  -0.187**  0.087*  0.058  0.074  -0.013   
  (0.044) (0.035) (0.037) (0.047) (0.044)  (0.071)     
State 0.073  -0.094  -0.069**  -0.159**  -0.070**  -0.124**   
  (0.046) (0.055) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023)  (0.028)     
Privatized -0.081  0.019  -0.010  -0.047*  -0.025  -0.056**   
  (0.065) (0.064) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019)  (0.016)     
Log  employment  0.033** 0.041** 0.041** 0.052** 0.037**  0.042**   
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006)     
Big city dummy  -0.046*  0.010  0.019  0.009  0.034*  0.044**  
  (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014)     
No  competitors  0.035 0.034 -0.023 0.015 -0.022 -0.008     
  (0.042) (0.040) (0.026) (0.034) (0.025)  (0.023)     
>3  competitors  0.025 -0.025 -0.020 0.001 0.018 0.032*   
  (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.016)     
Price inelastic  0.030  0.053**  0.024  0.073**  0.054**  0.041*  
  (0.027) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018)  (0.019)     
Price slightly elastic  0.039  0.062**  0.032**  0.045**  0.039*  0.062**  
  (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017)     
Price  elastic  0.063**  0.018 0.018 0.007 0.020 0.046*   
  (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020)  (0.019)     
Dom compet pressure  0.024*  0.017**  0.002  -0.007  0.006  -0.020**  
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007)     
Foreign compet press  0.033**  0.043**  0.014**  0.008  0.001  0.030**  
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007)     
Customer  pressure  0.003  0.018** 0.028** 0.035** 0.035**  0.020**   
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.007)     
Majority foreign 
ownership  -0.087**  -0.003  0.020  0.011  -0.042  -0.027   
  (0.026) (0.024) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024)  (0.024)     
Exporter dummy  0.047  0.10**  0.066**  0.073**  0.082**  0.023   
  (0.025) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.020)  (0.021)     
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Country dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
R-sq.  0.238 0.285 0.192 0.201 0.165  0.208     
Observations  807  1,953 2,070 1,358 1,621  1,213 
Note: The dependent variable is strategic restructuring 4-variables index. “Very elastic” is omitted price elasticity 
category. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: ** - significant at 1%, 
* - significant at 5%. 
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Table VI.4:  Deep restructuring and financing 
Dependent variable: 2-indicator deep restructuring index 
Model:  Pre-2001 EU members 
(I & II) 
Transition economies 
(III-V) 
Intercept 0.329**  0.347**  0.306**  0.280** 
 (0.075)  (0.076)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
Privatized -0.046  -0.052  0.064**  0.071** 
 (0.106)  (0.105)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
New private  -0.055  -0.060  0.129**  0.140** 
 (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Majority foreign owned  -0.056*  -0.050  -0.011  -0.012 
 (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
No competitors  0.019  0.022  -0.008  -0.010 
 (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.020)  (0.021) 
>3 competitors  0.005  0.007  0.006  0.007 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Exporter dummy  0.165**  0.168**  0.089**  0.090** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Big city dummy  -0.002  0.001  0.039**  0.033** 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Log employment  0.045**  0.043**  0.042**  0.046** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
No loan dummy  -0.065**    -0.071**   
 (0.015)    (0.007)   
No external finance    -0.093**    -0.058** 
   (0.015)    (0.007) 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-sq. 0.19  0.19  0.14  0.14 
Observations 2,885  2,813  13,900  13,603 
Note: The dependent variable is strategic restructuring 2-variables index. Data from 
2004/5 for pre-2001 EU member states and from 2002 and 2005 for transition economies. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: ** - 
significant at 1%, * - significant at 5%. 
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Appendix: Decomposing Employment Growth 
 
The decomposition method, commonly used in labor economics, attempts to attribute the difference in the 
dependent variable across two groups of observations into the difference in the explanatory variables 
(endowments), the difference in the relationship between the endowments and the dependent variable 
(coefficients), and a remaining factor which is the interaction between endowments and coefficients.
12 In 
particular, a differential can be decomposed as follows: 
 
R = y1-y2 = (x1-x2)β2 + x2(β1 - β2) + (x1 – x2)( β1 - β2) = E + C + CE 
 
where R denotes the raw differential between the means of the dependent variable y measured for two 
groups of observations, x is the row vector of the means of the explanatory variables x1,...,xk, and β1 and β2 
the column vectors of the coefficient for the two groups. In the final part of the expression, 
E=Endowments, C=Coefficient, and CE=Interaction of C & E. The question that usually comes up is how 
to allocate CE.  In the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, it is allocated along with coefficients, so that 
Explained = Endowments and Unexplained = Coefficients + Interaction.  However, CE can also be 
allocated to E, or even divided between E and C. In what follows we allocate the interaction effect along 
with the coefficient effect. 
 
We consider 3 sources of differences in growth: ownership, sectors, and size.  The decompositions are 
performed for the following groups of countries:  
  Cohesion group versus EU8 member states 
  EU8 member states versus SEE group 
  EU8 member states versus CIS group 
  SEE countries versus CIS economies.  
 
 There are almost no privatized and state firms in our sample of cohesion countries, and we therefore drop 
any remaining privatized and state firms from the Cohesion group.  The TE groups retain these. The 
benchmark category (excluded from the decomposition regressions) is new private firms. The regressions 
contain 2 dummy variables for the remaining ownership categories, privatized and state-owned firms. They 
also include 6 dummy variables for sectors. For simplicity of estimation and interpretation, we do not 
interact sector and ownership dummies thus assuming that the sector growth patterns do not vary by 
ownership. In contrast, size effects in our specifications can vary by ownership, since we want to separate 
size effects from ownership effects (for example, new private firms can grow fast because they are small 
and/or because they are entrepreneurial). Therefore, we interact size (average employment over 2002-05 
measured in thousands) and ownership to get size-ownership effects for the TEs.  
                                                 
12 We use Ian Watson’s (2005) “decomp” addin for Stata for all our decompositions.   72
 
The results of the decomposition analysis, presented in Tables A1-A8 should be read the following way 
(using Table A1 as an example).  
The first piece of information is the size of the differential to be explained (just above the main table).  This 
is a percentage growth rate, e.g., in the first table the gap is 8.04% faster aggregate employment growth in 
Cohesion countries than in EU8 countries. 
 
The first block of results is the “Amount attributable to” E, C, CE, and E+C+CE=total differential.  Note 
that the E+C+CE total equals the total differential to be explained.  These are grouped by: Sectors; Size 
(new private); Sectors + Size (new private; Ownership (levels and size effects); 
 
The second and third blocks of results are the regression coefficients on which the decompositions are 
based (including their statistical significance), the means, and the coeff*mean = predicted values.  Thus in 
the table for Cohesion vs.  EU8 countries, the coefficient of 14.20 for Construction times the mean of 0.130 
(=13% of total employment in construction) = 1.85 percentage points of the total Cohesion employment 
growth of 6.40%. 
 
In the aggregate employment growth results, the total gap is about 8 percentage points.  Sectoral 
differences explain about -4 percentage points, i.e., faster sectoral growth, and endowments of employment 
in faster growing sectors, actually shrink the Cohesion-EU8 gap (help the New EU countries close the gap).  
New private size effects are negligible.  All the action is in ownership (mostly in levels though there is a 
privatized size effect): continued downsizing of state owned and new private firms in the New EU 
countries more than explains the employment growth stagnation. 
 
The same results are visible in the Cohesion vs EU8 coefficients and means.  The coefficients can be 
interpreted as aggregate growth rates for sectors, and the growth rate relative to the new private sector for 
ownership (state and privatized).  The sum of the predicted values for Cohesion = 6.40%, which is the 
growth rate of total employment.  The sum for the EU8 new private firms is 10.20%, which is faster than in 
the Cohesion.  This is completely wiped out by the negative ownership effect of -11.85%. 
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Table A1. Decomposition of aggregate employment growth, Cohesion vs. EU8 countries. 
 
Positive number = gap between Cohesion (high growth) and EU8 (low growth) 
E=Endowments (employment in sector/category); C=Coefficient (growth in sector/category); CE=Interaction of C & E  
 
Size-ownership interactions - WEIGHTED 
Cohesion growth  6.40 
EU8 growth  -1.64 
Differential=E+C+CE 8.04 
 
  Amount attributable to  Cohesion  EU8 
Variables E  C  CE  C+CE 
E+ 
C+CE  Coef. Sig.  Mean  Pred.  Coef.  Sig. Mean.  Pred. 
Construction  0.35  -0.10 -0.02  -0.12 0.23  14.20    0.130 1.85 15.12  ***  0.107  1.62 
Manufacturing 1.01  -2.18  -0.91  -3.09  -2.08  0.69    0.471  0.33  7.25  **  0.332  2.41 
Transport -2.25  -0.39  0.27  -0.12  -2.37  10.68  **  0.083  0.89  12.11  ***  0.269  3.26 
Trade 0.05  -0.83  -0.02  -0.85  -0.80  8.17  *  0.185  1.51  12.75  ***  0.181  2.31 
Real  estate  0.02 0.96 0.03 0.99 1.01  22.22  ***  0.083 1.84 10.31  **  0.080  0.83 
Hotels & restaurants  0.04  0.12  0.07  0.19  0.22  5.84  **  0.048  0.28  1.99    0.030  0.06 
  Sectors (all)  -0.79  -2.41  -0.59  -3.00  -3.79         6.69         10.48 
Size (new private)  -1.46  0.23  1.21  1.45  -0.02  -0.22    1.320  -0.30  -1.32    0.212  -0.28 
  Sectors/new private size  -2.25  -2.18  0.62  -1.56  -3.81         6.40         10.20 
State  7.43  7.43  -7.43  0.00  7.43  n.a.   n.a.     -20.64 ***  0.360  -7.43 
Size  (state)  -0.39  -0.39  0.39  0.00  -0.39  n.a.   n.a.     0.34   1.153  0.39 
  State/state size  7.04  7.04  -7.04  0.00  7.04  n.a.    n.a.          -7.04 
Privatized  2.64  2.64  -2.64  0.00  2.64  n.a.   n.a.     -10.37 **  0.255  -2.64 
Size  (privatized)  2.16  2.16  -2.16  0.00  2.16  n.a.   n.a.     -2.70 ***  0.801  -2.16 
  Privatized/privatized size  4.80  4.80  -4.80  0.00  4.80  n.a.    n.a.            -4.80 
                         
Total  9.60  9.65  -11.21  -1.56  8.04           6.40           -1.64 
Memo item: number of obs            2,011  2,786 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%   74
Table A2. Decomposition of average firm employment growth, Cohesion vs. EU8 countries. 
 
Positive number = gap between Cohesion (high growth) and EU8 (low growth) 
E=Endowments (number of firms in sector/category); C=Coefficient (mean firm growth in sector/category); CE=Interaction of C & E  
 
Size-ownership interactions - UNWEIGHTED 
Cohesion growth  7.70 
EU8 growth  5.49 
Differential=E+C+CE 2.21 
 
  Amount attributable to  Cohesion  EU8 
Variables E  C  CE  C+CE 
E+ 
C+CE  Coef. Sig.  Mean  Pred.  Coef.  Sig. Mean.  Pred. 
Construction -0.10  0.50  -0.04  0.46  0.36  11.51  ***  0.130  1.50  8.01  ***  0.143  1.14 
Manufacturing 0.21  -0.46  -0.07  -0.53  -0.32  3.97  ***  0.265  1.05  5.97  ***  0.229  1.37 
Transport -0.34  -0.26  0.06  -0.20  -0.54  13.50  ***  0.078  1.05  16.10  ***  0.099  1.59 
Trade -0.19  0.49  -0.05  0.44  0.24  7.29  ***  0.284  2.07  5.75  ***  0.318  1.83 
Real  estate  -0.21 0.70 -0.10 0.60 0.39  15.93  ***  0.122 1.95 11.00  ***  0.142  1.56 
Hotels & restaurants  0.09  -0.04  -0.03  -0.08  0.01  1.14    0.121  0.14  1.77    0.070  0.12 
  Sectors (all)  -0.54  0.93  -0.24  0.69  0.14        7.75        7.61 
Size (new private)  0.17  -0.15  -0.20  -0.35  -0.18  -0.62    0.089  -0.06  3.32    0.038  0.13 
  Sectors/new private size  -0.37  0.78  -0.44  0.34  -0.04        7.70        7.74 
State  1.22  1.22  -1.22  0.00  1.22  n.a.   n.a.   -15.61 ***  0.078  -1.22 
Size  (state)  0.05  0.05  -0.05  0.00  0.05  n.a.   n.a.   -1.38   0.035  -0.05 
  State/state size  1.27  1.27  -1.27  0.00  1.27  n.a.    n.a.          -1.27 
Privatized  0.93  0.93  -0.93  0.00  0.93  n.a.   n.a.   -10.14 ***  0.092  -0.93 
Size  (privatized)  0.05  0.05  -0.05  0.00  0.05  n.a.   n.a.   -2.13 **  0.025  -0.05 
  Privatized/privatized size  0.98  0.98  -0.98  0.00  0.98  n.a.    n.a.          -0.98 
                         
Total  1.88  3.02  -2.68  0.34  2.21       7.70       5.49 
Memo item: number of obs            2,011  2,786 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%   75
Table A3. Decomposition of aggregate employment growth, EU8 countries vs. SEE countries 
 
Positive number = gap between EU8 and SEE 
E=Endowments (employment in sector/category); C=Coefficient (growth in sector/category); CE=Interaction of C & E  
 
Size-ownership interactions - WEIGHTED 
EU8 growth  -1.64 
SEE growth  -7.53 
Differential=E+C+CE 5.88 
 
  Amount attributable to  EU8  SEE 
Variables E  C  CE  C+CE 
E+ 
C+CE  Coef. Sig.  Mean  Pred. Coef. Sig. Mean.  Pred. 
Construction -0.50  -0.49  0.10  -0.39  -0.89  15.12  ***  0.107  1.62  18.77  ***  0.133  2.50 
Manufacturing -2.13  -4.36  1.21  -3.15  -5.28  7.25  **  0.332  2.41  16.74  ***  0.459  7.69 
Transport 2.21  -1.33  -0.90  -2.23  -0.02  12.11  ***  0.269  3.26  20.37  ***  0.161  3.28 
Trade 0.36  -0.60  -0.08  -0.68  -0.33  12.75  ***  0.181  2.31  16.53  ***  0.159  2.63 
Real  estate  0.71  -0.31 -0.30  -0.61 0.10 10.31  **  0.080 0.83 17.91  **  0.041  0.73 
Hotels & restaurants  -0.01  0.08  -0.03  0.05  0.05  1.99    0.030  0.06  0.29  *  0.046  0.01 
  Sectors (all)  0.64  -7.01  0.00  -7.01  -6.37         10.48         16.85 
Size (new private)  -0.35  0.19  0.20  0.39  0.04  -1.32    0.212  -0.28  -3.15    0.101  -0.32 
  Sectors/new private size  0.30  -6.83  0.20  -6.62  -6.33         10.20         16.53 
State -1.60  5.44  0.73  6.17  4.56  -20.64  ***  0.360  -7.43  -37.77  ***  0.318  -12.00 
Size (state)  0.57  -0.14  -0.30  -0.44  0.12  0.34    1.153  0.39  0.72    0.370  0.27 
  State/state size  -1.04  5.30  0.43  5.72  4.69        -7.04        -11.73 
Privatized 3.93  9.15  -2.78  6.37  10.30  -10.37  **  0.255  -2.64  -35.37  **  0.366  -12.95 
Size (privatized)  0.55  -1.76  -1.57  -3.32  -2.78  -2.70  ***  0.801  -2.16  1.45    0.424  0.62 
  Privatized/privatized size  4.48  7.39  -4.35  3.05  7.53         -4.80         -12.33 
                                 
Total  3.74  5.86  -3.72  2.15  5.88           -1.64           -7.53 
Memo item: number of obs            2,786  1,654 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%   76
Table A4. Decomposition of average firm employment growth, EU8 vs. SEE countries. 
 
Positive number = gap between EU8 and SEE 
E=Endowments (number of firms in sector/category); C=Coefficient (mean firm growth in sector/category); CE=Interaction of C & E  
 
Size-ownership interactions - UNWEIGHTED 
EU8 growth  5.49 
SEE growth  9.37 
Differential=E+C+CE -3.88 
 
  Amount attributable to  EU8  SEE 
Variables E  C  CE  C+CE 
E+ 
C+CE  Coef. Sig.  Mean  Pred. Coef. Sig. Mean.  Pred. 
Construction 0.41  -0.11  0.04  -0.07  0.34  8.01  ***  0.143  1.14  8.80    0.091  0.80 
Manufacturing -0.56  -2.76  -1.12  -3.88  -4.44  5.97  ***  0.229  1.37  18.03  ***  0.322  5.81 
Transport 0.14  -0.33  0.03  -0.30  -0.15  16.10  ***  0.099  1.59  19.39  ***  0.090  1.74 
Trade -0.04  -2.64  -0.06  -2.69  -2.73  5.75  ***  0.318  1.83  14.03  ***  0.325  4.56 
Real estate  0.55  -1.47  0.52  -0.95  -0.40  11.00  ***  0.142  1.56  21.39  ***  0.092  1.96 
Hotels & restaurants  -0.02  -0.26  -0.04  -0.30  -0.32  1.77    0.070  0.12  5.48    0.080  0.44 
  Sectors (all)  0.49  -7.56  -0.63  -8.19  -7.70        7.61        15.31 
Size (new private)  0.02  0.15  -0.03  0.12  0.14  3.32    0.038  0.13  -0.59    0.031  -0.02 
  Sectors/new private size  0.52  -7.41  -0.65  -8.07  -7.55        7.74        15.29 
State 0.12  0.83  0.08  0.91  1.03  -15.61  ***  0.078  -1.22  -26.20  ***  0.086  -2.25 
Size (state)  -0.01  0.25  -0.03  0.22  0.22  -1.38    0.035  -0.05  -8.59  *  0.031  -0.27 
  State/state size  0.12  1.08  0.05  1.13  1.25        -1.27        -2.52 
Privatized 0.37  1.33  0.53  1.86  2.23  -10.14  ***  0.092  -0.93  -24.59  ***  0.129  -3.16 
Size (privatized)  0.02  0.12  0.05  0.17  0.19  -2.13  **  0.025  -0.05  -6.84    0.036  -0.24 
  Privatized/privatized size  0.40  1.44  0.58  2.03  2.42         -0.98        -3.41 
                         
Total  1.03  -4.89  -0.02  -4.91  -3.88       5.49       9.37 
Memo item: number of obs            2,786  1,654 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%   77
Table A5. Decomposition of aggregate employment growth, EU8 countries vs. Middle/Low Income CIS 
 
Positive number = gap between EU8 and CIS 
E=Endowments (employment in sector/category); C=Coefficient (growth in sector/category); CE=Interaction of C & E  
 
Size-ownership interactions - WEIGHTED 
EU8 growth  -1.64 
CIS growth  4.80 
Differential=E+C+CE -6.45 
 
  Amount attributable to  EU8  CIS 
Variables E  C  CE  C+CE 
E+ 
C+CE  Coef. Sig.  Mean  Pred. Coef. Sig. Mean.  Pred. 
Construction -1.05  -0.50  -0.33  -0.83  -1.88  15.12  ***  0.107  1.62  19.83  ***  0.176  3.49 
Manufacturing -0.86  -3.34  -1.19  -4.53  -5.39  7.25  **  0.332  2.41  17.31  ***  0.450  7.80 
Transport  1.41  -0.12 0.05  -0.07 1.34 12.11  *** 0.269 3.26 12.55  ***  0.153  1.92 
Trade  0.66  -0.69 0.20  -0.49 0.17 12.75  *** 0.181 2.31 16.55  ***  0.129  2.14 
Real estate  0.19  -0.42  0.10  -0.33  -0.14  10.31  **  0.080  0.83  15.55  **  0.062  0.97 
Hotels & restaurants  0.00  -0.41  0.03  -0.39  -0.38  1.99    0.030  0.06  15.53  *  0.028  0.44 
  Sectors (all)  0.35  -5.48  -1.15  -6.63  -6.28         10.48         16.77 
Size (new private)  0.25  0.24  0.21  0.44  0.69  -1.32    0.212  -0.28  -2.43  *  0.400  -0.97 
  Sectors/new private size  0.60  -5.25  -0.94  -6.19  -5.59         10.20         15.80 
State  -1.44 -0.18  0.04 -0.14 -1.59 -20.64  *** 0.360 -7.43 -20.15  ***  0.290  -5.85 
Size (state)  0.18  0.06  -0.03  0.03  0.21  0.34    1.153  0.39  0.28    0.617  0.18 
  State/state size  -1.26  -0.12  0.01  -0.11  -1.37        -7.04        -5.67 
Privatized 0.49  1.58  0.30  1.87  2.37  -10.37  **  0.255  -2.64  -16.56  ***  0.302  -5.01 
Size (privatized)  -1.24  -1.43  0.82  -0.61  -1.85  -2.70  ***  0.801  -2.16  -0.92    0.341  -0.31 
  Privatized/privatized size  -0.75  0.15  1.11  1.27  0.52         -4.80         -5.32 
                                 
Total  -1.41  -5.21  0.18  -5.03  -6.45           -1.64           4.80 
Memo item: number of obs            2,786  3,728 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%   78
Table A6. Decomposition of average firm employment growth, EU8 vs. Middle/Low Income CIS countries. 
 
Positive number = gap between EU8 and CIS 
E=Endowments (number of firms in sector/category); C=Coefficient (mean firm growth in sector/category); CE=Interaction of C & E  
 
Size-ownership interactions - UNWEIGHTED 
EU8 growth  5.49 
CIS growth  11.99 
Differential=E+C+CE -6.50 
 
  Amount attributable to  EU8  CIS 
Variables E  C  CE  C+CE 
E+ 
C+CE  Coef. Sig.  Mean  Pred. Coef. Sig. Mean.  Pred. 
Construction -0.01  -1.59  -0.01  -1.60  -1.61  8.01  ***  0.143  1.14  19.11  ***  0.144  2.75 
Manufacturing -0.37  -3.08  -0.84  -3.92  -4.30  5.97  ***  0.229  1.37  19.43  ***  0.291  5.66 
Transport  0.38 0.34  -0.08  0.26 0.64 16.10  *** 0.099 1.59 12.63  ***  0.075  0.95 
Trade -0.06  -3.56  -0.11  -3.68  -3.73  5.75  ***  0.318  1.83  16.95  ***  0.328  5.56 
Real estate  0.43  -0.83  0.23  -0.60  -0.17  11.00  ***  0.142  1.56  16.88  ***  0.102  1.73 
Hotels & restaurants  0.02  -0.97  0.15  -0.82  -0.80  1.77    0.070  0.12  15.64  ***  0.059  0.92 
  Sectors (all)  0.40  -9.69  -0.67  -10.36  -9.96        7.61        17.57 
Size (new private)  -0.01  0.25  0.01  0.26  0.25  3.32    0.038  0.13  -3.24    0.039  -0.13 
  Sectors/new private size  0.39  -9.44  -0.66  -10.10  -9.71        7.74        17.45 
State 0.12  0.29  0.03  0.32  0.43  -15.61  ***  0.078  -1.22  -19.30  ***  0.086  -1.65 
Size (state)  -0.01  -0.03  0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -1.38    0.035  -0.05  -0.54    0.028  -0.02 
  State/state size  0.11  0.26  0.03  0.29  0.40        -1.27        -1.67 
Privatized 0.88  1.06  1.00  2.06  2.94  -10.14  ***  0.092  -0.93  -21.72  ***  0.178  -3.87 
Size (privatized)  0.01  -0.12  -0.02  -0.14  -0.13  -2.13  **  0.025  -0.05  2.50    0.029  0.07 
  Privatized/privatized size  0.88  0.95  0.98  1.93  2.81         -0.98        -3.79 
                         
Total  1.38  -8.23  0.35  -7.88  -6.50       5.49       11.99 
Memo item: number of obs            2,786  3,728 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%   79
Table A7. Decomposition of aggregate employment growth, SEE countries vs. Middle/Low Income CIS 
 
Positive number = gap between SEE and CIS 
E=Endowments (employment in sector/category); C=Coefficient (growth in sector/category); CE=Interaction of C & E  
 
Size-ownership interactions – WEIGHTED 
SEE growth  -7.53 
CIS growth  4.80 
Differential=E+C+CE -12.33 
 
  Amount attributable to  SEE  CIS 
Variables E  C  CE  C+CE 
E+ 
C+CE  Coef. Sig.  Mean  Pred. Coef.  Sig.  Mean.  Pred. 
Construction  -0.80  -0.14  -0.05  -0.19  -0.99  18.77 ***  0.133  2.50  19.83 ***  0.176  3.49 
Manufacturing  0.14  -0.26  0.01  -0.26  -0.11  16.74 ***  0.459  7.69  17.31 ***  0.450  7.80 
Transport  0.16  1.26  -0.06  1.20 1.36 20.37  ***  0.161 3.28  12.55  *** 0.153  1.92 
Trade  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.50 16.53  ***  0.159 2.63  16.55  *** 0.129  2.14 
Real  estate  -0.38  0.10  0.05  0.15  -0.24  17.91 **  0.041  0.73  15.55 ***  0.062  0.97 
Hotels  &  restaurants  0.01  -0.71  0.27  -0.43  -0.43  0.29   0.046  0.01  15.53 ***  0.028  0.44 
  Sectors (all)  -0.39  0.25  0.22  0.47  0.09         16.85         16.77 
Size (new private)  0.94  -0.07  -0.22  -0.29  0.65  -3.15    0.101  -0.32  -2.43  *  0.400  -0.97 
  Sectors/new private size  0.55  0.18  0.01  0.18  0.74         16.53         15.80 
State  -1.04 -5.60  0.48 -5.11  -6.15  -37.77  *** 0.318 -12.00 -20.15  ***  0.290 -5.85 
Size  (state)  -0.18  0.16  0.11  0.27 0.09  0.72    0.370 0.27 0.28    0.617  0.18 
  State/state size  -1.22  -.543  0.59  -4.84  -6.06        -11.73        -5.67 
Privatized  -2.25 -6.88  1.20 -5.69  -7.94  -35.37  *** 0.366 -12.95 -16.56  ***  0.302 -5.01 
Size  (privatized)  0.12  1.00  -0.20  0.81 0.93  1.45  ***  0.424 0.62  -0.92    0.341  -0.31 
  Privatized/privatized size  -2.13  -5.88  1.00  -4.88  -7.01         -12.33         -5.32 
                                 
Total  -2.79  -11.14  1.60  -9.54  -12.33           -7.53           4.80 
Memo item: number of obs            1,654  3,728 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%   80
Table A8. Decomposition of average firm employment growth, SEE vs. Middle/Low Income CIS countries. 
 
Positive number = gap between SEE and CIS 
E=Endowments (number of firms in sector/category); C=Coefficient (mean firm growth in sector/category); CE=Interaction of C & E  
 
Size-ownership interactions - UNWEIGHTED 
SEE growth  9.37 
CIS growth  11.99 
Differential=E+C+CE -2.62 
 
  Amount attributable to  SEE  CIS 
Variables E  C  CE  C+CE 
E+ 
C+CE  Coef. Sig.  Mean  Pred. Coef.  Sig.  Mean.  Pred. 
Construction  -0.46  -0.94  -0.54  -1.48  -1.95  8.80   0.091  0.80  19.11 ***  0.144  2.75 
Manufacturing  0.55  -0.45  0.04  -0.41 0.14 18.03  ***  0.322 5.81  19.43  *** 0.291  5.66 
Transport  0.29  0.61  -0.10  0.51 0.79 19.39  ***  0.090 1.74  12.63  *** 0.075  0.95 
Trade  -0.05  -0.95  -0.01  -0.96  -1.01  14.03 ***  0.325  4.56  16.95 ***  0.328  5.56 
Real  estate  -0.23  0.41  0.05  0.46 0.23 21.39  ***  0.092 1.96  16.88  *** 0.102  1.73 
Hotels  &  restaurants  0.12  -0.82  0.22  -0.60  -0.48  5.48   0.080  0.44  15.64 ***  0.059  0.92 
  Sectors (all)  0.22  -2.14  -0.35  -2.49  -2.27        15.31        17.57 
Size (new private)  0.01  0.08  0.02  0.10  0.11  -0.59    0.031  -0.02  -3.24    0.039  -0.13 
  Sectors/new private size  0.22  -2.06  -0.33  -2.38  -2.16        15.29        17.45 
State  -0.01  -0.59  0.00  -0.59 -0.60 -26.20  ***  0.086 -2.25  -19.30  ***  0.086  -1.65 
Size  (state)  -0.03  -0.25  0.02  -0.23 -0.25  -8.59  *  0.031 -0.27 -0.54    0.028  -0.02 
  State/state size  -0.04  -0.84  0.03  -0.82  -0.85        -2.52        -1.67 
Privatized  1.22  -0.37  -0.14  -0.51  0.71  -24.59 ***  0.129  -3.16  -21.72 ***  0.178  -3.87 
Size  (privatized)  -0.05  -0.33  0.06  -0.27 -0.32  -6.84    0.036 -0.24  2.50    0.029  0.07 
  Privatized/privatized size  1.17  -0.70  -0.08  -0.78  0.39         -3.41        -3.79 
                       
Total  1.36  -3.60  -0.38  -3.98  -2.62       9.37       11.99 
Memo item: number of obs            1,654  3,728 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1% 
 